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"A person who has some retirement income can also draw
unemployment compensation under present circumstances.
Corrective legislation should be enacted, because I believe it is the
intent to take care of those unemployed who are in real need, but
not to give windfalls to people who are not actually, or morally, at
least, if they are legally, entitled to it under present laws."
Cong. Clarence Brown,
Cong. Record, 87:1, 2940, March 1, 1961
"Millions of people in the country today draw pensions, most of
which are inadequate. If such persons were caught up in the
present unemployment situation, some of them would have that
unemployment compensation reduced by the amount of their
pension payments. If anyone can show me 100 cases in which the
persons involved are getting rich out of the unemployment
compensation, I will apologize publicly to the Senate."
Sen. Hubert Humphrey,
Cong. Record, 87:1, 4197, March 16, 1961
"Gold had chipped in for the good used car in which Gussie drove
them about in Florida. To Sid, Julius gave all the credit. 'Sid fixed
it so I would first get my unemployment insurance, then my Social
Security.' "
Joseph Heller, Good as Gold, 1979
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call of duty in obtaining various documents needed for the
preparation of the monograph. Careful typing was provided by
Judy Smalley and Terie Snyder. Comments on various parts of the
manuscript were received from Paul Burgess, Philip Booth,
Robert Hutchens, Jerry Kingston, and, most especially, from Saul
Blaustein. Nguyen Quan should be viewed as a coauthor of
chapter 2, though in no way is he responsible for any conclusions
later in the monograph that may be linked to that chapter. Harold
Hamermesh provided the initial inspiration for undertaking this
study. Finally, I am indebted to the W. E. Upjohn Institute for
Employment Research for providing the funding that made the
study possible. Neither they nor the individuals I have thanked are
in any way responsible for any errors remaining in the work, nor
for any opinions expressed.
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Foreword
In April 1980, federal legislation took effect requiring a
dollar-for-dollar reduction in payment of unemployment insur
ance benefits to recipients of pension and Social Security benefits.
This study is an especially timely inquiry into the likely
distributional effects of the change and its potential effects on
labor market and consumption behavior of older people.
The aging of the U.S. population will have an increasingly
important effect on federal transfer programs such as unemploy
ment insurance. Dr. Hamermesh analyzes a number of policy
issues within an economic framework and addresses his findings to
current discussion of income maintenance policy for the elderly.
Facts and observations presented in this monograph are the sole
responsibility of the author. His viewpoints do not necessarily
represent positions of the W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment
Research.
E. EarlWright
Director
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Chapter 1
Unemployment Insurance
and Pensioners—
Provisions and Problems

Introduction

The debate typified by the epigraph to this volume was over
provisions proposed as part of the temporary extension of the
potential duration of unemployment insurance (UI) benefits
during the 1961 recession. While pensioners were not denied
regular UI benefits, the compromise legislation did provide that
extended UI payments should be reduced by the amount of
pension benefits (but not Social Security old age benefits)
received. This debate spurred a rash of studies by state UI research
groups on the extent to which pensioners receive UI benefits, and a
summary of these studies with a consideration of the policy issues
was produced by Merrill Murray (1967).
The issue appeared dead between 1967 and 1975: no state
studies were done on the subject, and, while bills were occasionally
introduced on it in Congress, none even led to hearings, much less
to floor debate. In 1976, though, after substantial hearings and
debate, and as part of a complex series of changes included in the
UI Amendments of 1976, a federal standard of a dollar-for-dollar
reduction of UI payments against all retirement income was
enacted.' The debate over this restriction paralleled that in the
1. P.L. 94-566. The provision was not included in the House bill, but was added by the
Senate Finance Committee, approved by the Senate and by the House-Senate Conference
Committee. It states, "the amount of compensation payable to an individual for any week
which begins after September 30, 1979 [later amended to March 31, 1980], and which
begins in a period with respect to which such individual is receiving a governmental or other
pension, retirement or retired pay, annuity, or any other similar periodic payment which is
based on the previous work of such individual shall be reduced (but not below zero) by an
amount equal to the amount of such pension, retirement or retired pay, annuity or other
payment, which is reasonably attributable to such week."
1
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1961 debate, though in 1976 there appeared to be a greater
awareness, even on the part of liberal legislators, that abuses
occurred. For example, one stated:
[It] should be clear that it is unconscionable and an
aberration of our unemployment compensation laws that
some retirees with large annuities or pensions also are
permitted to receive unemployment compensation benefits.
The public perceives this as a rip-off of Government funds,
and justifiably so. ... [However], it does not make good
sense or good public policy to completely cut off from the
unemployment compensation system a retiree who receives $5
a month from a pension or annuity. 2
The 1976 legislation was initially intended to become effective in
1979, "permitting the National Commission on Unemployment
Compensation [created in the 1976 Amendments] opportunity for
a thorough study of this issue and the Congress to act in light of its
findings and recommendation." 3 (Because of delays in organizing
the Commission, the effective date of the restriction was later
delayed until 1980. Efforts were also made to prevent the
restriction from ever taking effect or to weaken its impact, but it
became effective in April 1980.)4 It is this restriction on the
simultaneous receipt of retirement benefits and UI and the stated
need "for a thorough study" that provide part of the motivation
for this volume.
The need for a study is underscored by the lack of available
information on the distribution of UI payments among the
elderly, among pensioners in particular, and on how UI affects
their behavior. Discussions of the merits of restricting UI
payments to pensioners have often ignored what would seem to be
basic issues. The effect of such a restriction on the distribution of
income within the entire population and among older workers
2. Senator Gaylord Nelson, Congressional Record, 94:2, 17016, September 29, 1976.
3. House Conference Report No. 94-1745, page 16.
4. In June 1979, Congressman Corman of California introduced H.R. 4464 to repeal the
federal restriction on the receipt of UI by pensioners. His bill received substantial support
from groups of retired persons, from the AFL-CIO, and from representatives of the
Department of Labor in hearings held in September 1979.
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alone has not been considered. Potential effects on the ability of
older workers to maintain living standards at or above some
minimum level have also received no attention. Nor has the effect
of such a restriction on the operation of the labor market,
particularly on the retirement decision of older workers, been
considered in discussions of this policy. Instead, the recommenda
tions have been based either on arguments regarding the proper
role of federal legislation in setting standards for state UI laws, or
on arguments that the restriction would introduce needs
considerations into a program that has been a social insurance
rather than a welfare program. 5
It is hoped that this volume will fill part of the void. It should
also shed some additional light on the more general, and
increasingly important, issue of retirement behavior. With the age
structure of the population of the United States tilting toward
people 55 and over, the neglected area of the economics of the
elderly needs to be considered in much greater depth. As a
byproduct of the general discussion of UI and the elderly, and of
examination of the economic merits of restricting UI payments to
pensioners, the findings of this study should also enhance the
existing knowledge of the economic situation of the older
population. Before delving into the particular studies that
comprise the bulk of this volume, though, the way in which state
UI laws treat the issue and the general outcomes of those laws
among the older population need to be considered.
Facts About UI and Older People
in the U.S. and Elsewhere
As table 1.1 shows, persons 55 years and older comprised nearly
one-sixth of all UI recipients in a recent year. This was nearly
double their representation among the unemployed counted in the
5. For example, the National Commission on Unemployment Compensation (NCUC)
disposed of its obligation to consider the issue by arguing that the federal restriction should
not be allowed to become effective: (1) Because no other benefit standards at the federal
level have been adopted; and (2) Because it implies viewing UI as a needs-based program
(NCUC, Interim Report, November 1978, pp. 95-100). The Commission does not appear to
have engaged in any formal study of this issue.
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monthly Current Population (household) Survey (CPS) used to
compute the national unemployment rate. The figures are not
quite comparable; older workers do account for a greater fraction
of CPS unemployment among experienced workers than is implied
by column (2) in the table. However, after appropriate
adjustments are made, it may be inferred that workers 55 and over
represented about 10 percent of unemployed job losers, job
leavers, and labor force reentrants.6 Comparing this to their share
of insured unemployed, it may be inferred, though by no means
has it been proven, that the UI system is paying benefits to a
disproportionate number of elderly individuals who do not
consider themselves to be unemployed by the commonly accepted
criteria contained in the household survey. This finding
underscores the importance of the problem of payment of UI
benefits to the older population, and points out the necessity of
more detailed analysis of the issue such as is contained in chapters
2 - 4 of this volume.
There are no data on the amount of UI benefits received by
individuals 55 and over. It is likely, though, that around $1.5
billion of the benefits paid in 1978 accrued to older workers, as
this figure amounts to one-sixth of the $9 billion in UI payments
for that year. Since base-period earnings, and thus weekly
benefits, are likely to be at least as high among older recipients as
for the average UI beneficiary, and since duration is longer for
older workers, the $1.5 billion may even be a low estimate.
Further, studies by the U.S. Bureau of Employment Security of
claimants of regular state UI benefits (done in conjunction with
the Temporary Extended Unemployment Compensation Act of
1961) show that 7 percent of all claimants also received Old Age
6. In 1977, new entrants to the labor force accounted for 14 percent of the unemployed in
the CPS data. Assuming none of these is age 55 or over, and removing them from the totals
in order to get a count of the experienced unemployed, results in an estimated 9.7 percent
(8.5 x 1.14) of the experienced unemployed age 55 +. This is a far smaller percentage than
their representation among the insured unemployed. It may appear unusual to include
unemployed reentrants and job leavers in the unemployed for purposes of this comparison,
as few people in either category are likely to be among the insured unemployed. However,
unlike new entrants, there is no reason to assume that older workers are less than
proportionately represented among the CPS unemployed classified as job leavers or
reentrants. Thus their retention in the calculation will not bias the comparison.
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and Survivors' Insurance (OASI) retirement benefits, 3 percent
received other retirement benefits, and 8 percent of all claimants
received some form of retirement benefit. Since only 21 percent of
UI claimants in 1961 were 55 or over, it may be concluded that a
substantial fraction of older claimants in 1961 received some
pension income. 7 This conclusion is likely to be even more valid in
1979. (Chapter 2 provides some more detailed evidence on this.)
As shown below, there has been only a slight expansion since the
early 1960s in the extent to which states impose restrictions on
receipt of retirement income and UI benefits. At the same time,
the coverage and level of private pension benefits (including those
paid to government employees) and of OASI have been increasing.
(Partly as a result, people are retiring earlier in life.)
That the coverage of private pension programs has increased is
unquestionable. In 1965, pension recipients accounted for only 7.8
percent of individuals 55 and over; by 1974, this figure had risen to
15.5 percent. 8 (Note that this is based on individuals; clearly,
substantially higher percentages of people 55 and over are in
families containing persons who received part of their income in
the form of pension benefits.) Beneficiaries of OASI retirement
programs also increased in the same period, from 39.6 percent of
people 55 and over in 1965 to 47 percent in 1974. Moreover, OASI
retirement benefit amounts became much more liberal after 1970.
Until that year, the average primary insurance amount never
7. Calculated from Haber and Murray (1966, p. 474) and from Department of Labor,
Bureau of Employment Security, TEUC Report, No. U-225-5. The 21.5 percent figure is,
as can be seen from a comparison with table 1.1, substantially above today's percentage.
The difference is even greater than it appears; 1961 was a year of deep recession, whereas
1977 represented a recovery year, and the fraction of older workers among the insured
unemployed is lower in a recession (see Hamermesh 1977, p. 22). The apparent long term
decline in the representation of older workers among the insured unemployed likely has
three causes: (1) The drop in labor force participation among persons 55 + in the past
twenty years has meant that fewer older persons are eligible for UI if they are not at work;
(2) Expansions of coverage have been to industries and firms that employ proportionately
fewer older workers than industries that were already covered by 1961; and (3) A sharp rise
in the fraction of youth in the population and the labor force has occurred.
8. The numerators for these calculations are from Munnell (1977, p. 6), and the
denominators are from Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, P-25, Nos. 321
and 643.
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exceeded 32 percent of the average wage in manufacturing. (It was
29 percent in 1965.) By 1974 it had climbed to 37 percent, and in
1976 it was 40 percent of the manufacturing wage. 9 The 1977
Social Security Amendments, which legislated long-run stability in
replacement rates, ensure that, while this rise will not continue,
replacement rates will stay at the higher levels of the early 1970s
rather than revert to the lower levels of the 1960s. We may
conclude that both the coverage and levels of retirement schemes,
both employer-based pensions and Social Security retirement
benefits, have increased substantially since the middle 1960s.
Table 1.1
Percentage of Older Workers Among the Insured Unemployed, All
Unemployed, and the Labor Force, by Selected Sex-Age Categories,
1977 a_____________________________________
___ Percent older workers among;______
Sex-age
Insured
All
Civilian
category
unemployed b
unemployed___labor force
Men
55-59
3.9
)
4.4
3.6
60-64
3.3
)
2.8
65-12.8
1.4
1.9
Women
55-59

2.7

60-64
65+

2.1
1.6

)
\
j

2.8
.7

2.8
1.6
1.1

Total 55 +________16.4________8.5________14.6
SOURCE: Unemployment Insurance Statistics, October-December 1977 and 1978;
Employment and Training Report of the President, 1978.
a. As a percent of the entire population in the category,
b. Fiscal year 1977.

9. Munnell (1977, p. 64).
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The effect of these rather sudden changes is shown by the data
in table 1.2. While there was little change in the relative economic
position of households headed by older persons in the 1960s, there
has been a steady and sharp improvement since that time in their
relative incomes. This is especially true for households headed by
persons 65 and over, and it has occurred despite the continued
trend of a decreasing fraction of persons 65 and over remaining in
the labor force. Improvements in private and public retirement
income programs have clearly been the dominant factor in these
changes in the economic position of older Americans.
Table 1.2
Median Income of Families Headed by Older Persons, Relative to
Median Income of All Families, by Age of Household Head, 1964,1969,
1973, 1977__________________________________
Ratio to median family income of all families:
1964
1977
1973
Age of head
1969
All ages
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
55-64
1.023
1.019
1.061
1.076
.514
.533
65 +
.509
.569
SOURCE: Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, P-60, Nos. 47, 75, 97, 118.

At the beginning of the UI program, most states denied benefits
to recipients of OASI retirement benefits (see Haber and Murray
1966). Over the years these restrictions were eased, so that by
1964, as table 1.3 shows, only 18 states, containing 26 percent of
the covered work force, imposed any restrictions on the
simultaneous receipt of OASI retirement benefits and UI
payments. This changed little between 1964 and 1979: in 1971,
only 14 states, containing 27 percent of the covered work force,
imposed such a restriction; the figures for January 1979 were 17
states and 23 percent. Further, in January 1979 only two states,
Arizona and Oregon, completely disqualified a recipient of such
benefits (though Wisconsin did so, too, in certain cases); in most
of the other 15 states there are provisions for prorated reductions
in UI benefit payments related to the amount of OASI payments
received.

8
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Table 1.3
Summary of State UI Statutory Provisions on Pension Restrictions,
1964, 1971, and 1979
Percent of covered
Number
employment in
of jurisdictions 8
__fiscal year
Provision
1964
1971
1979
1964
1971
1978
No restriction
20
19
15
32.6
29.2
22.5
Restrict old age
insurance only
1
1
1
4.5
5.0
6.1
Restrict pension from
base-period
employer only
12
16
18
35.0
33.5
41.4
Restrict pension from
any employer
2
3
3
6.7
9.8
12.9
Restrict old age
insurance and baseperiod employer
5
8
3.2
2.6
7.3
Restrict old age
insurance and
any employer
12
10
8
18.0 19.9
9.8

TOTAL

52

52

53

100.0

100.0

100.0

SOURCE: Comparison of State UI Laws, January 1964; August 1971; January 1979;
Unemployment Insurance Statistics, November 1964; July-September 1971; OctoberDecember 1978.
a. Based on UI provisions as of January in 1964 and 1979 and as of August in 1971.

The number of states that restrict the simultaneous receipt of
private pensions and UI benefits has grown over the years. There
was little legislation on this in the early days of the federal-state UI
program, but by 1964, 31 states, having 63 percent of the covered
work force, imposed some form of restriction. This changed little
in the 1960s, but by January 1979, 37 states, containing 71 percent
of covered employment, imposed restrictions of this sort. While
restriction is thus fairly widespread, its effects may not be as
important as they appear, as only two states, Arizona and
Wisconsin, deny benefits to pension recipients. Further, in most
other states the prorated reduction in benefits is made only for

UI and Pensioners

9

those pension receipts towards which a large fraction of the
contributions has been made by the employer; even then, in most
cases, only pensions from the base-period employer are restricted.
The trend of legislation in this area leads to several conclusions
about public thinking on the issue. Although OASI retirement
benefits have become much more liberal over the years, states
appear to be continuing the "federal policy that unemployment
compensation should not be denied to persons drawing federal
old-age insurance benefits." 10 However, the increasingly wide
spread applicability of private pension plans, often noncontributory or only partly employee-financed, appears to have spurred
more states to impose more restrictions on the receipt of UI
benefits along with private pension payments.
The United States is among the more generous Western nations
in allowing the simultaneous receipt of UI benefits and public or
private retirement benefits. Two types of restriction are common
in other Western countries, and in most they involve complete
denial rather than just pro rata reductions in UI benefits. In some
countries, benefits are denied to workers who have reached a
certain age regardless of their current or prior labor force status.
(Often the age limit is higher for men than for women.) These
include Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland (in some cantons),
and the United Kingdom. In other countries the restriction is
based on the receipt of a pension, or upon receiving a pension and
attaining a certain age. These nations include Canada, Italy, and
Norway. 11 As the U.S. is generally considered to have one of the
less liberal panoplies of income maintenance systems, it is not
clear why on this particular issue our policy is unusually liberal. It
may be, though, that the politics of running 53 separate state UI
programs (including the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and
the Virgin Islands) along with a single federal old age benefit
program has prevented the integration that exists in other
countries where policy for both programs is set by the national
10. Haber and Murray (1966, p. 472).
11. This information is taken from Blaustein and Craig (1977, Table 4).
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government. Similarly, there may have been less concern here,
until recently, about providing incentives to older workers to stay
in the labor force.
What This Monograph Does
The central portion of this monograph consists of three essays
on the economic impact of UI on the older worker. Chapter 2
examines one of the equity aspects of the program, namely, the
effects of UI on the distribution of income among older people
and the potential impact of the pension restriction embodied in the
1976 UI Amendments. Unless we know which older people will be
hurt more by the restriction, all the arguments about the need to
maintain the program's integrity as social insurance or to maintain
a proper federal-state structure will have little impact. So too will
the usual economists' arguments about the potential disincentive
effects the program may currently contain.
Chapter 3 examines a different aspect of the equity impact of UI
on the older population. Rather than considering how it affects
the relative economic standing of members of the population, it
examines instead how much UI really serves to prevent severe
hardship among older recipients. In this context, the analysis
focuses on whether and to what extent the program prevents the
individual older worker from being forced to curtail his purchases
sharply when he experiences a spell of unemployment. This
analysis can inform us whether UI is needed by the older
population, or whether it merely enables most older recipients to
add a few extra consumption items not part of the basic
commodities required for a minimally acceptable standard of
living.
Chapter 4 considers the relationship between receipt of UI
benefits and subsequent retirement and labor force status. While
Murray (1967) did summarize the state studies of this relationship,
none of those studies held constant for other factors that affect
people's decisions to retire. Moreover, none contained a
nationally representative sample of older workers, making the
results obtained in those studies somewhat difficult to generalize.
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In this examination of the issue, other factors that have been
shown to affect retirement decisions are accounted for, and the
analysis is based on a national sample of UI recipients and other
older people.
Each of the three chapters uses as the basis for the empirical
work the data from the Retirement History Survey. This survey,
conducted by the Bureau of the Census for the Social Security
Administration, was based on persons age 58-63 in 1969. The
sample was representative of the older population in the groups of
married men, unmarried men, and single women, as it included all
such persons in the most recent discontinued Current Population
Survey (CPS) rotation groups. Nineteen such groups were used in
order to produce a sufficiently large sample; since the CPS is
representative of the population, the Retirement History Survey is
representative of older men and unmarried older women.
The initial wave of successful interviews included 11,153
persons, of whom 60.7 percent were married males, 10.7 percent
unmarried males, and 28.6 percent single females. Exactly 90
percent of the respondents in 1969 were white; 21.4 percent had a
high school diploma only, and 16.5 percent had completed at least
one year of college. Each surviving respondent was to be
reinterviewed biennially through 1979. When the work embodied
in chapters 2-4 was done, data were available for 1969, 1971, and
1973. For each wave, interviewing was done between April and
June of the survey year. Because of death and other causes of
sample attrition, only 9,924 people remained in the sample in 1971
and only 8,928 in 1973. 12 Each of the three essays uses a subsample
of the main survey in which only those households or individuals
are included for whom all the required data are available. In each
essay, the data's validity is discussed by comparing characteristics
of the subsample to those of the entire sample. In no case did this
comparison suggest that the subsamples were not representative.
12. A description of the survey is contained in Irelan et a/.(1976). Information on sample
attrition and more detailed problems with the data are discussed in the tape documentation
available from the National Archives.

12
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While the questionnaire used in the survey is not so complete on
matters of prior earnings and job-related issues as those in several
other surveys used by economists, it is unique in having both
detailed data on retirement-related issues and data on income by
source and expenditure by type. 13 Moreover, it is also unique in its
restriction to a narrow age cohort of older workers. As such, it
provides the best available source of information with which to
analyze the role of unemployment insurance in the lives of older
Americans.
13. These include the National Longitudinal Surveys, conducted by Ohio State University,
and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, conducted by the University of Michigan.

Chapter 2
Pensions and Unemployment
Insurance: Effects on
Income Distribution

Introduction
This chapter focuses on the distribution of unemployment
insurance (UI) benefits among older Americans and the effects of
this transfer on the distribution of income. There has recently been
an upswing in interest among policy analysts in the effect of UI
and other income maintenance schemes on the distribution of
economic well-being, as measured by total income. Since such
programs are aimed at least partly at equalizing the income
distribution, this interest seems well focused. In the UI area,
Feldstein (1974) presented data that he claimed indicated UI aided
middle- and upper-income families and thus was disequalizing.
Hamermesh (1977) showed that these data nonetheless imply that
UI payments make the distribution of incomes more equal, though
this does occur because they aid middle-income, not lower-income
families. Classen (1977) and Feldstein (1977) present evidence
from other data sets that corroborates this interpretation.
All of the available studies on the distributional effects of UI are
based on data sets that represent random samples of the entire
U.S. population. Their comparisons of income distributions may
thus be misleading, for they are based on differences in current
incomes among people of different ages, rather than on
differences in the present values of income over an entire lifetime.'
Because this study uses a data set that contains individuals of
roughly the same age, that problem is circumvented.
1. Taussig (1973) and Paglin (1975) have shown that adjusting income distributions to
account for life-cycle differences produces substantial changes in estimated measures of
inequality.
13

14
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The sample of older workers also makes it possible to examine
more closely the potential impact of the recently enacted federal
standard that reduces UI benefits by one dollar for each dollar of
retirement benefits the individual receives. This essay examines
how much it is likely to reduce the incomes of a typical group of
older Americans, and how the income reductions are distributed
across income groups. The only available study of this problem,
Ehrenberg, Hutchens, and Smith (1978), finds that the restriction
will sharply reduce the equalizing effects of UI benefits. However,
because that study included individuals of all ages, its result was
guaranteed: anything that reduces the incomes of older workers
will increase inequality in the population as a whole, since older
workers have lower-than-average incomes because of aging effects
and smaller investments in education and training. Analysis of this
question using the sample of older workers should avoid this
problem and produce better estimates of the effect of this
restriction on income inequality among people who differ only by
income, not by both age and income.
This essay first considers the characteristics of the persons
included in subsamples constructed from the Retirement History
Survey. Next, it examines how many of their households would
have suffered reduced benefits had the federal restriction been in
effect, and how large the reductions would have been. It then
examines whether UI benefits make the distribution of incomes
across households more or less equal, and how the restriction
would have affected the income distribution within this
population subgroup.
Data and Methods
The Retirement History Survey contains detailed data on
amounts of income received each year, by source, for each
household member, so that the distribution of aggregate income
can be determined and the impact of reductions in UI benefits that
are linked to the receipt of pension income can be examined.
Because the data on incomes by source are very unreliable for
1969, most of the work is based on the data from the 1971 and
1973 interview waves (1970 and 1972 incomes).
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Incomes of households are examined, not of individuals. This is
done because it is the household that is the primary consuming
unit for which economic welfare should be measured. In order to
assure comparability of the sample between 1971 and 1973, only
the 8,928 households that were in the sample in both years were
included in the analysis. Furthermore, in each year, some of the
data on one or more of the income flows were missing or coded in
a way inconsistent with the tape documentation, and additional
observations were deleted from the sample for these reasons. After
the deletions, the sample consisted of 6,300 households in 1971
and 6,556 households in 1973, roughly three-fourths of those
available from the households still in the sample in 1973, but only
60 percent of those that started in the first wave of this
longitudinal survey. A combined subsample of 4,862 households
for which data are available on income flows by type for both 1970
and 1972 incomes was also formed.
As noted in chapter 1, the Retirement History Survey (RHS) is a
representative sample of the population of older workers. Because
the data on income by source are incomplete, it is necessary to use
subsamples from the RHS for the analyses in this chapter. Are
these subsamples still representative of the older population? Two
considerations suggest this question should be answered in the
affirmative. First, as shown in the next section, both the fraction
of households in the subsamples that have UI as part of their
incomes, and the fraction UI represents in total income, appear
quite close to the respective values for the entire population.
Second, average household income in 1970 in the first subsample
was $8,045, and in the second subsample in 1972 it was $8,101.
This corresponds fairly closely to national statistics for the
relevant population. 2
2. We use data on male household heads with wife present, unrelated males and unrelated
females, from Current Population Reports, Series P-60, No. 80, Table 17, and No. 90,
Table 19. Using the Retirement History Survey weights for these three groups, we find that,
among consuming units in which the head (or single individual) was 55-64, income was
$9,591 in 1970. Our sample was somewhat older than the average person 55-64, so this
figure corresponds reasonably well to our sample average, especially considering the
weighted population average was $5,437 for persons 65 and over. In 1972 the weighted
average for the three groups for household heads (or unrelated individuals) 55-64 was
$10,811. This is far above our average, but by 1972 the persons in our sample were between
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Household income is constructed as the sum of incomes from all
sources for all household members. 3 In order to analyze the
potential impact of the pension restrictions, each household
member's income from UI benefits was reduced by an amount
equal to his or her pension and Social Security benefits, with the
maximum reduction equal to the total UI benefit actually received.
This dollar-for-dollar reduction in UI benefits captures the
changes that result from the legislative restriction, a reduction that
cannot decrease UI benefit income below zero. For each
household in the sample, total income in the presence of the
restriction would have been the sum of each member's non-UI
income and the UI benefits left after the restriction is accounted
for.
As of January 1979, a number of states had reduced UI benefits
if the claimant received certain pension income or, in a few cases,
Social Security retirement benefits. The data on UI income
reported in the Retirement History Survey will, for individuals in
those states, already reflect the reduction in UI benefits that
occurred because of restrictions imposed in state legislation as of
the time of the surveys. The simulations, therefore, show only the
net impact of imposing the federal restriction contained in the
1976 UI Amendments in addition to the state restrictions. Thus,
for example, if it is found that the net effect of the federal
restriction will be to reduce UI payments to older workers by 50
percent, one may be sure that the total effect—of the prior state
and the new federal restrictions—exceeds 50 percent. Similarly, if
it is found that 30 percent of older workers receiving UI benefits
61 and 66, and their income would be much farther below that of the average person 55-64.
Indeed, their income appears to be a fairly close approximation to what must be the
population mean when one considers that the weighted average for the three groups in the
category age 65 + is $6,405.
3. The original data contain a limit on income by type of $50,000 for each recipient as well
as $50,000 on each reported aggregation of income. Thus, while our procedure of summing
all reported income flows to obtain income aggregates rather than relying on the aggregate
figures in the data should avoid part of the underreporting problem, it does not completely
vitiate the problem. Nonetheless, in the age cohort used, and for the years 1970 and 1972, it
is unlikely that very much income received by households in the sample is missed by our
analysis. Certainly, given limits on UI benefit maxima, no UI benefit income will be
missed.
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also received retirement income, it may be concluded that a greater
fraction of UI recipients would have received both types of income
had there been no state restrictions. 4
The estimates of the net impact of the federal restriction may be
overstated, since the data reflect twelve-month totals of pensions,
UI benefits and other income, yet the restriction is based on
receipts of UI benefits and pensions within one week. Someone in
the sample could have received UI benefits from January through
June and pension income from July through December. The
federal restriction would not affect him, yet in the calculations his
UI benefits would be reduced dollar-for-dollar. 5 All that can be
done is to note that this will cause an overestimation of the total
effect, but not the distributional impact of the restriction.
Total Effects of the Pension Restriction
Before examining the effects of the pension restriction, it is
necessary to consider whether the estimates of UI income in the
subsamples are consistent with the known aggregates of UI
benefits paid out in the two years covered by the survey. Table
2.1 presents some of the characteristics of the subsamples in each
of the two years. Roughly 4 percent of the households have
income from UI in each year, but the average UI income per
recipient household is much higher in 1972 than in 1970. UI
income as a fraction of total income in the subsample increased
from .36 percent in 1970 to .56 percent in 1972. This increase is far
in excess of what can be explained by the growth in weekly benefit
amounts, the expansion of coverage, or reduced eligibility
requirements. Between 1970 and 1972, the average weekly benefit
paid under the UI program increased by 11 percent, far less than
the 64 percent increase ($695 to $1,143) in UI incomes per recipient
4. As we saw in chapter 1, though, in January 1979, only a minority of covered
employment was in states in which both major sources of retirement income—OASI and
pensions—were disqualifying income under UI. Thus it appears likely that the extent of the
difference between the gross effect and the net impact of the federal restriction will not be
very great.
5. Clearly, if the federal restriction were imposed, we would expect many individuals to be
induced to draw UI and pension benefits in different weeks within a given year.
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household indicated in table 2.1. 6 Further, total UI benefits in
1970 accounted for .48 percent of personal incomes nationwide; in
1972 they accounted for only .53 percent. 7 (This increase in UI as a
fraction of total incomes is likely due to the lingering effects of the
1970-1971 recession; aggregate unemployment was 4.9 percent of
the labor force in 1970, 5.6 percent in 1972.) While these figures
are within the range of those in the third row of table 2.1, they do
not show the same large increase. There are two possible reasons
for this discrepancy. First, the older unemployed workers in the
sample (and, by inference, older unemployed workers in general)
experience sharply lengthened spells of unemployment as they
near retirement age. The constancy of the percent of households
receiving UI benefits in each year suggests that the increased
importance of this income source as the cohort ages is not
produced by any increasingly widespread receipt of UI. Second,
Extended Benefits (EB) were instituted between the two survey
years. Since these only accrue to workers with long average
durations of unemployment, and since older workers have
above-average durations, they would have benefited particularly
from the enactment of EB.
Table 2.1 also shows that most of the recipients of UI in 1972
did not receive pension or OASI income in 1970, and thus
presumably were in the labor force in 1970. Of the household
heads who received UI benefits in 1972, only 11.9 percent received
pension income in 1970, compared to 29.4 percent for the entire
sample. This suggests that UI benefits go disproportionately to
those older workers who have a continuing labor force
attachment. They do not go to workers who move off retirement
income, into work, and then into compensated unemployment:
only 1.6 percent of all household heads who received retirement
income in 1970 received UI in 1972. Rather, as the sample cohort
ages, more and more members of the sampled households appear
6. Calculated from U.S. Department of Labor, Handbook of UI Financial Statistics,
1938-1976. It is also likely that the increase was less for older people, as we know from,
inter alia, Mincer (1974), that earnings, which determine the entitlement, fall between ages
59-64 and 61-66.

7. Calculated from Ibid, and from Economic Report of the President, 1979.
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to be drawing retirement benefits and UI at the same time. By
1972, when the household heads in the sample were between 61
and 66, 48.5 percent of the households in which UI was received
contained an individual who received both types of income.
Moreover, 44 percent of household heads who received UI also
received pension or OASI income in 1972. These estimates are
quite similar to those produced by the Temporary Extended
Unemployment Compensation studies in 1961 (cited in chapter 1).
The data suggest that UI is a cushion for the older worker in the
process of retirement. It is not a payment that represents part of a
process of movement from the receipt of retirement income to
reliance on earnings and work-related transfer income. (In chapter
4, this process is examined in detail.)
Table 2.1
Selected Characteristics of Households of Older Persons, 1970 and 1972
Characteristic
1970
1972
All households:
Number
6300
6556
Percent with UI benefits
4.1
4.0
UI benefits as a percent of total income
.36
.56
Percent with pension or OASI income
received by:
Household head
29.4
52.5
Spouse
7.7
14.5
Other household members
1.3
5.0
All households with UI income:
Number
Average UI income
Percent containing persons with
UI and retirement income
Percent with heads having UI in 1972
and pension income in 1970

260
$695

260
$1143

26.9

48.5
11.9

Table 2.2 presents the simulated effects of the retirement
restriction on individuals in the households in the subsamples for
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each of the two years. 8 Not surprisingly, given the increased
importance of retirement income for these households observed in
table 2.1, the reduction in UI by retirement income has far greater
effects in 1972, when the household heads are between 61 and 66
years old, than in 1970, when they are between 59 and 64. In 1970,
slightly over one-fourth of the households that received UI income
would have seen their benefits reduced as a result of the
restriction, and this would have meant a 27 percent decline in total
benefits received by households in the sample. In 1972, the same
restriction would have affected nearly half of all recipient
households, and total UI benefits received would have been
reduced by nearly 41 percent. (The figures for 1972 may be slightly
swollen by early retirement induced by the mild 1970-71
recession.)
Table 2.2
Selected Effects of the Retirement-Income Restriction, 1970 and 1972
Percent
1972
____________Effect______________1970
All households
Reduction in UI benefits as a
.23
.10
percent of total income
All households with UI income
48.5
26.9
Percent with reduced UI benefits
Reduction in UI benefits as a percent
40.6
27.0
of total benefits
Reduction in UI benefits as a
percent of total income____ ___ _____2.6____6.0

The main conclusion to be drawn from these results is that the
retirement-income restriction enacted in the 1976 UI amendments
will drastically reduce the amount of UI income accruing to
8. To be consistent with the language of P.L. 94-566, we include in retirement income all
Social Security payments other than Disability Insurance and Survivors' benefits (and
obviously Medicare) as well as receipts from private pension plans. Income from purchased
annuities is not included in the measure of retirement income, as it does not appear to come
under the rubric, "based on the previous work."
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workers in their early and middle 60s, and decrease somewhat less
sharply the incomes of slightly younger workers. It was estimated
in chapter 1 that at least $1.5 billion of UI benefits in 1978 accrued
to individuals age 55 or over. Because the published data do not
tell what fraction of benefits goes to workers classified by age, the
simulations of the effect of the retirement income restriction
cannot produce too accurate an estimate of the income loss
induced by the restriction. Nonetheless, taking the reduction in UI
benefits among households headed by persons 59-64 (the 1970
subsample) to be typical, it is estimated that the restriction would
have reduced UI benefits received in 1978 by the elderly—and also
reduced UI taxes—by $400 million. 9
Effects on the Distribution of Income

Table 2.3 presents the distributions of UI benefits and all other
income by decile of all other income for the 1970, 1972, and
combined subsamples. 10 The income is slightly more equally
distributed in the combined subsample than in either of the two
individual subsamples. For example, in the combined subsample
the share of income accruing to households in the highest decile is
30.33 percent, as opposed to 31.47 percent in the 1970 subsample,
and 30.92 percent in the 1972 subsample. Similarly, households in
the lowest decile of other income received 1.36 percent of all other
income in the combined subsample, but only 1.13 percent and 1.34
percent in the 1970 and 1972 samples respectively. The greater
equality of income distribution in the combined subsample, for
which the data are in essence an average of two years of income,
results from the averaging out of extreme random variations.
Consider now the distributions of UI benefits across households
ranked by income deciles. In each year, and in the two subsamples
9. This figure is calculated as $1.5 billion times .27, the reduction in UI benefits in the 1970
sample.
10. For purposes of analyzing the distributional impact of UI benefits in this sample of
older workers, we use an expanded definition of income that adds 6 percent of the net value
of owner-occupied housing to other income flows. This adjustment makes our income
measure more comparable to those used in the Feldstein (1974) and Ehrenberg, Hutchens,
and Smith (1978) studies.
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combined, households in the lowest decile receive disproportion
ately small shares of total UI payments compared to their shares
of all other income. 11 (This is not surprising, for the household
heads in the lowest income decile are unlikely to have worked
recently, and thus are unlikely to be eligible for UI benefits.) By
the eighth (third lowest) decile, this is reversed: shares in total UI
exceed shares in all other income. This continues until the third
income decile (the second in the combined sample), at which point
shares in total UI benefits begin to fall below shares in all other
income. In summary, households in the lowest income decile
receive a less than proportionate share of UI benefits, as do
households in the highest deciles, while those households between
the third through ninth deciles receive more than proportionate
shares of UI.
The effect of UI benefits on the distribution of income can be
seen more clearly by considering figures 1 through 3. The solid
curved line in each graphs the relation between the cumulative
percent of UI benefits and the cumulative percent of all other
income. If households in each income decile received the same
share of UI benefits as they did of all other income, the line would
be diagonal; if households in the lowest decile received all the UI
income, the line would follow the left and top edges of the box; if
households in the highest decile received all UI benefits, it would
follow the bottom and right edges of the box. In short, UI benefits
equalize the distribution of income if the solid line lies above the
diagonal.
The figures show that in fact the solid lines do lie above the
diagonal in all three samples. UI benefits are equalizing, in the
sense that on net they are received by individuals who receive a
less-than-proportionate share of all other income. Even when
variations in income resulting from life-cycle behavior and secular
improvements in the quality of education and training are
accounted for by using a sample that is nearly homogeneous in
age, UI benefits are still found to equalize the income distribution
11. This result is similar to that of Ehrenberg, Hutchens, and Smith (1978) for a random
sample of families, and it is also similar to the phenomenon underlying the data presented
by Feldstein (1974), though it does not support the interpretation he drew from those data.
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by providing aid disproportionately to lower-middle and
middle-income individuals. 12
Table 2.3
Percentage Distributions of UI Benefits and All Other Income in Older
Workers' Households, 1970, 1972, and Combined Subsamples___
Percentage distributions
Combined
subsample
1970
1972
Other
Other
Other
Sample
UI
income
UI
income
UI
decile8
income
1.34
.09
.45
1.36
1.13
.58
Lowest
2.96
Ninth
2.02
2.66
2.49
2.90
2.66
7.77
Eighth
4.10
4.09
10.46
3.98
3.95
7.83
5.64
10.70
5.53
11.00
5.42
Seventh
13.23
7.16
Sixth
13.04
7.10
9.83
6.96
14.71
8.77
Fifth
16.46
8.67
8.88
8.54

Fourth
Third
Second

Highest
TOTAL
N

17.42
10.54
11.47
12.73
11.48
16.36
6.50
31.47
100.00 100.00
6300

16.41
10.43
12.60
12.90
12.30
16.88
21.41
30.92
100.00 100.00
6556

15.10
10.54
13.22
12.93
15.85
16.51
9.24
30.33
100.00 100.00
4862

a. Based on non-UI income.

Summary statistics calculated for the three samples (shown in
Appendix A) suggest less equalization of income than that
reported by Ehrenberg, Hutchens, and Smith (1978). This may be
the result of differences in the definitions of income, but it may
also be produced by the homogeneity in age in the survey. Because
the sample does not include the high wage earners ages 40 to 54
12. This conclusion is corroborated by similar calculations on the sample's 1968 income.
(Although the poor data on retirement incomes prevent our simulating the effect of the
federal restrictions, the UI benefits appear to be usable.) The degree of inequality in a
graph for 1968 analogous to figures 1-3 is greater than that for 1970 or 1972. That the
income-equalizing effect of UI benefits is strongest in 1968 is not surprising: only 3.4
percent of households reported receiving UI income in that high-employment year when the
few unemployed are disproportionately low-skilled, low-wage workers.
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Figure 1
Cumulative Percentage Distributions of UI Benefits, With and Without
Retirement-Income Restriction, and All Other Income, 1970
Percent of
benefits

Percent of all other income
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Figure 2
Cumulative Percentage Distributions of UI Benefits, With and Without
Retirement-Income Restriction, and All Other Income, 1972
Percent of
benefits
Without restriction

With restriction

Percent of all other income
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Figure 3
Cumulative Percentage Distributions of UI Benefits, With and Without
Retirement-Income Restriction, and All Other Income, Combined
Subsample
Percent of
benefits

Percent of all other income
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who are at the peak of their earnings profiles and who are unlikely
to be unemployed, the comparisons of the distributions of benefits
and income automatically remove some of the equalizing effect.
Nonetheless, even with the removal of this additional life-cycle
phenomenon, it is still found that UI benefits equalize the income
distribution.
Perhaps the biggest anomaly in the results is the sharply reduced
equalizing effect of benefits in 1972, when the household heads
were between ages 61 and 66, as compared to 1970, when they
were ages 59-64. (Notice that the solid line in figure 2 lies much
closer to the diagonal than it does in figure 1.) The likeliest
explanation for this is suggested by the data in table 2.1 showing
that the percentage of respondents with pension income jumped
from 29 to 52 percent in this two year period, a clear reflection of
the increased fraction of the sample reaching age 65. As the
bottom line of table 2.4 shows, the number of households drawing
most of their income from pensions and OASI—those in which the
head is no longer attached to the labor force—also increased. 13
With it, the number of households in which members are unlikely
to have received UI benefits must have increased as well, given UI
eligibility requirements. If these households had not saved enough
to produce retirement incomes sufficient to maintain their prior
living standard, their incomes upon retirement would have placed
them relatively low in the income distribution in their age cohort.
This is precisely what can be observed in table 2.4—the percentage
of households whose income consists chiefly of retirement income
decreases almost steadily as one moves up the income distribution.
Thus the fraction of UI benefits accruing to lower-income
members of the cohort that are fully retired decreases, for an
increased proportion of lower-income households could not have
been receiving UI benefits.

13. A similar pattern is shown if table 2.4 is recalculated for all households whose
retirement income exceeds 50 percent of the total. In 1970 this was true for 14.5 percent of
the households; in 1972, for 32.2 percent.

28

Income Distribution

Table 2.4
Percentage of Households with Retirement Income at Least 75 Percent
of Total Income, by Sample Decile of Total Income, 1970 and 1972
1972
Decile of total income
1970
25.6
40.4
Lowest
22.3
35.1
Ninth
Eighth
13.3
27.8
9.0
28.5
Seventh
Sixth
7.5
24.8
Fifth
5.4
19.3
Fourth
3.8
14.9
Third
2.2
9.8
Second
1.3
5.8
Highest
1.1
3.5
All households
9.2
21.0

Having shown that UI benefits equalize incomes, even
abstracting from life-cycle considerations, the remaining task is to
examine the effect of the proposed restriction on UI benefits for
those who also receive retirement income. Table 2.5 presents the
distributions of UI benefits by decile of other income, both before
and after adjustment for the retirement-income restriction. The
dotted lines in figures 1-3 relate the cumulative shares of UI
benefits, after adjustment for the restriction, to the cumulative
shares of all other income. For the 1970 and combined
subsamples, summary statistics (see Appendix A) suggest that the
restriction equalizes the distribution of incomes within this age
cohort still further. For 1972 the opposite is true: the statistics
indicate that, while UI benefits are still equalizing in this
subsample of 61 to 66 year olds, their effect is less equalizing than
in the absence of the retirement-income restriction.
This difference in the results between the two years can be
examined in more detail by comparing the graphs of the pairs of
distributions in figures 1-3. The dotted line in figures 1 and 3 lies
uniformly above the solid line that shows the actual relationship
(without the restriction). In these two sets of results, the restriction
is uniformly equalizing: each lower group in the income

Table 2.5
Percentage Distributions of UI Benefits, Before and After the Retirement-Income Restriction, by Sample Decile of
Other Income, 1970, 1972, and Combined Subsamples
Percentage distribution of UI benefits
Combined
1972
1970
After
Before
After
Before
After
Decile of other
Before
restriction
restriction
restriction
restriction
restriction
restriction
income
.15
.09
.59
.58
.61
.45
Lowest
3.87
2.96
3.41
2.90
2.07
2.02
Ninth
9.22
7.77
3.75
4.09
11.95
10.46
Eighth
8.36
7.83
12.98
11.00
10.46
10.70
Seventh
16.03
13.23
9.22
9.83
13.11
13.04
Sixth
14.76
14.71
6.85
8.88
18.78
16.46
Fifth
Fourth
Third
Second
Highest

17.42
11.47
11.48
6.50

16.95
11.66
9.00
5.41

16.41
12.60
12.30
21.41

13.40
13.80
6.54
29.46

15.10
13.22
15.85
9.24

16.12
10.77
13.95
6.77

TOTAL

100.00

100.00

100.00

100.00

100.00

100.00
cr

c

NO
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distribution receives a greater share of UI benefits when the
restriction is applied than when it is not.
The same is obviously not true for 1972, as figure 2 shows.
Nevertheless, from the lowest up to and including the sixth decile
of the income distribution, the curve in figure 2 showing the
distribution of UI benefits with the restriction lies above the curve
without the restriction. While on net the restriction reduces the
equalizing effect of UI, it does increase the share of UI benefits
accruing to households in the bottom half of the distribution of
incomes among households headed by persons ages 61-66. This
equalizing effect is more than offset by the reductions in the shares
accruing to households in the higher (second through fifth)
deciles, and the large increase in the share of UI benefits going to
the highest decile when the pension restriction is applied.
Why does the sharp difference in the results between 1970 and
1972 arise? One cannot be entirely sure, but it is likely that the
same phenomenon is at work here that produced the much smaller
equalizing effect of UI benefits in 1972 as compared to 1970 that
was shown in table 2.3. The highest two deciles in the income
distribution in 1972 contain relatively few families in which an
individual is still partly attached to the labor force yet also
receiving some retirement income. In the next three lower deciles,
more individuals are apparently both receiving retirement income
and are partly attached to the labor force and thus eligible for UI
benefits when unemployed. That this difference occurs reflects the
apparent shortsightedness of savers, shown by the lower position
in the income distribution in table 2.4 of those whose incomes are
composed to a large degree of pension and other income resulting
from savings. Thus when the restriction is imposed, it is
households that have moderate incomes but receive substantial
amounts of both UI and retirement incomes that are hit most
severely, while the highest decile of households, containing as it
does relatively few recipients of retirement income, is only slightly
affected. 14 The lower half of the income distribution is also not so
14. Households in the highest income decile would suffer a reduction in UI benefits as a
result of the pension restriction, but they would still receive 81 percent of the UI benefits
they get without the restriction. This compares to a sample average of only 59 percent in
1972.
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greatly affected because, as table 2.4 shows, so many individuals
in it are completely retired that they are not likely to remain
eligible for UI. These same facts did not affect the results so
strongly in the 1970 sample, for the incidence of receipt of
retirement income was much lower when the sample was two years
younger.
Summary and Implications
In this chapter, a number of aspects of the effect of UI
payments on the distribution of incomes among households
headed by older individuals have been examined. Using data from
the Retirement History Survey, it has been found that : (1) UI
benefits make the distribution of income more equal than it would
have been had no benefits been paid; (2) the restriction on
retirement income would reduce UI benefits received by
households headed by persons 59-64 years old by 27 percent, and
by 41 percent among households headed by persons 61-66 years of
age; and (3) the retirement-income restriction would make the
distribution of incomes more equal across households headed by
persons age 59-64. In a sample composed of two years' income of
persons ages 59-64 in one year and 61-66 two years later, the same
result is observed. Only in a sample restricted to one year's income
of households headed by persons 61-66 years old would the
retirement-income restriction make the income distribution less
equal.
These results shed new light on the effects of UI payments on
the income distribution. When one accounts for differences in
life-cycle behavior by confining the analysis to a relatively narrow
age group, one finds that the payment of UI benefits makes the
distribution of income more equal within that age group. It does
this by decreasing the income shares of the highest three deciles
and increasing those of households in the third through ninth
deciles. Results obtained in previous studies that failed to account
for life-cycle effects, a problem that seriously affects comparisons
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of income distributions, remain valid when this failure is
remedied. 15
In the group of 61 to 66 year olds, the disequalizing effect of the
retirement-income restriction occurs because the highest-income
group is aided at the expense of the upper middle-income groups.
Even in this sample, though, households in the lower half of the
income distribution improve their relative position as a result of
the restriction. This observation, coupled with the results for the
combined subsamples in which extremes in income are averaged
out, suggests that the pension restriction might be on net an
equalizing force on the distribution of income within the cohort of
older households. At the very least, these results are quite
inconsistent with the notion that the restriction would decrease
income equality. They seem to contradict the finding of
Ehrenberg, Hutchens, and Smith (1978), based on a sample of
households of all ages.
Unemployment insurance is an income maintenance program.
Any change in its structure should be examined for its impact on
the income distribution, since the major goal of such programs is
to preserve living standards. To view it in this light produces a
quandary. On the one hand, the retirement-income restriction
would increase, or at least not reduce, income equality among the
older population. On the other hand, older workers are generally
less well-off than the average worker. The restriction would, by
reducing incomes solely among households headed by older
workers, decrease income equality in the population as a whole. 16
Repealing the restriction would maintain the UI system as a
vehicle for redistributing income toward the elderly, albeit the
higher-income elderly.
15. For example, Paglin (1975) shows that in 1972 one-third of the inequality implicit in
data on the income distribution resulted from differences in ages of the households.
Because of changes in the age structure of the U.S. population, this effect had grown from
roughly 20 percent in 1947.
16. The reduction in UI benefits would reduce UI taxes. In the absence of any information
about tax incidence for such taxes, we make the standard assumption that the rise in
after-tax incomes is proportionate across the population, and thus does not affect our
measures of the percentage distribution of other income.
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Taking the long view and considering the distribution of
incomes over the lifetime of a population cohort, one should,
though, ignore this consideration of intergenerational equity:
repeal of the restriction would aid groups late in their lives who are
better off throughout their lives. That they happen to be poorer,
on average, late in life than their children should be an irrelevant
consideration for a program that does not specifically have as its
goal the maintenance of incomes among the older population.
Considering only the issue of the effects on the distribution of
income, the retirement-income restriction is beneficial in that it
will probably make the distribution of lifetime incomes more
equal. If one wishes to raise incomes among older persons, there
are other programs targeted to them that are better suited for that
purpose.

Chapter 3
Unemployment Insurance
and Consumption
Among Older Workers

Introduction

Disqualifying pensioners from receiving UI benefits, or
reducing their benefits, could have a detrimental impact on their
well-being if their consumption is seriously affected by the
disqualification. It is, after all, the living standard—consump
tion—of the population that has been a major focus of social
insurance since its inception. For example, in the debate before the
establishment of the UI system in the thirties, one leading observer
noted, "Provision for those whose income has ceased because of
unemployment will constitute a major problem of practical
economics for years to come." 1 In his message to Congress
transmitting Social Security legislation, President Roosevelt
stated, "Among our objectives I place the security of men, women
and children of this Nation first. . . . They want some safeguard
against misfortunes which cannot be wholly eliminated in this
man-made world of ours." 2 Indeed, the preamble to the bill that
eventually became the Social Security Act stated that it was
designed "to alleviate the hazards of old age, unemployment." 3
Haber and Murray (1966, chapter 2) state that the prime objective
of UI is the prevention of hardship caused by job and wage loss.
This chapter considers how the older household will respond to
unemployment by changing its consumption. Within the context
1. Eveline M. Burns, "The Economics of Unemployment Relief," American Economic
Review, 23, March 1933.
2. Message of June 8, 1934.
3. 74th Congress, 1st Session, H.R. 4142, submitted by Representative David Lewis on
January 17, 1935.
35

36

UI and Consumption

of the standard economic view of consumption, it presents an
analysis of how UI benefits will be spent and whether benefits
received by a household in which someone is unemployed will be
spent differently from the household's usual source of income.
Such analysis will make it possible to deduce the fraction of older
households for which benefits are adequate in the following sense:
does the household receive sufficient benefits or have access to
prior savings or to borrowed funds that enable it to maintain
consumption at the level it would have had a household member
not been unemployed? Since the likelihood that a household has
past savings or can borrow may depend upon its income, there is
also an examination of whether benefit adequacy varies with the
household's income level attained before the spell of unemploy
ment started.
The estimates of benefit adequacy and its correlates are all made
from subsamples of the Retirement History Survey (RHS), using
consumption data from 1970 and 1972. In addition, the RHS
provides data on expenditures for several different spending
categories by households in which the heads are roughly the same
age, making it possible to examine the types of items that UI
recipients consume disproportionately and those on which
additional UI benefits are spent. The results of these examinations
can be used to determine whether the living standards of older
recipients will be severely hurt by the restriction on UI benefits
received by pensioners, since it can be inferred whether a
significant proportion of older households already find benefits
inadequate.
How Will UI Benefits Affect Consumption?
The economic theory of consumption is based on the view that
people have a good idea of their lifetime incomes and the length of
time they intend to be working during their lives. 4 In its simplest
4. The theory of consumption generally accepted by economists is that of Friedman (1957).
Its major implications are that increases in income that are expected to persist will have a
nearly one-for-one effect on current consumption, while those that are considered
temporary will have only a minute effect on consumption today. The notion that some
individuals must adjust consumption because of an inability to borrow has been discussed
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form the theory states that individuals will save enough during
their work lives to ensure that their consumption does not drop
during their retirement. If members of the Jones household expect
to work 40 years and live 10 years in retirement, and income is
$10,000 per year while working, the household will, according to
the theory, consume $8,000 per year in each year of its life. This
means that the Joneses will save $2,000 per year during the work
lives of their members, so that they have enough savings to keep
consumption at $8,000 per year during retirement. (This example
ignores any interest that may be earned on savings, or any
preference the household may have for consumption today over
consumption in the future. These are complications that do not
qualitatively affect the conclusions drawn.)
Consider what happens if in one year the household's income
drops to $5,000, and in the next year it rises (for that year only) to
$15,000. The household's lifetime income has not changed; if it
can borrow or dip into savings in the first year, it will maintain
consumption at $8,000. Similarly, in the second of these two years
it will save $7,000 or repay loans. The main point is that, given the
rationality of smoothing consumption over the household's
lifetime, transitory variations in income will not greatly affect
consumption. 5 Instead, consumption will be affected by the
household's permanent, or average income per year of its life.
Clearly, this theory is highly refined; as with most theories, one
can criticize it as being too abstract, unable to account for quirks
of individual behavior, or overly simplified. These criticisms are
correct. Yet, the theory has been powerful enough to explain such
diverse phenomena as: (1) The post-1945 economic boom, an
expansion that occurred when most people expected a return to the
Depression as wartime military spending ended; (The boom
by Tobin and Dolde (1971). Its implications for spending out of UI benefits are derived in
Hamermesh (1979), and, for the behavior of the unemployed generally, by Flemming
(1978).
5. That smoothing consumption is rational is demonstrated in extreme form by the
following consideration: most persons would rather consume $20,000 worth of goods with
certainty than have a 20 percent chance of consuming $100,000 and an 80 percent chance of
consuming nothing.
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occurred because people's lifetime income had increased during
the World War II boom, yet consumption had not because of
wartime rationing.) and (2) The reduction in private saving
induced by the advent of Social Security, with its provision of
public saving for retirement. 6 Other examples can also be offered.
Rather than discussing them, consider what the theory implies
about the relation between consumption and UI benefits.
How would the Jones family respond to the receipt of $1,000 in
UI benefits during the year in which its other income is only
$5,000? As noted earlier, because it could borrow or dip into prior
savings, its consumption would have been $8,000 that year even if
no benefits had been received. The $1,000 does raise the
household's lifetime income; but, assuming the household
attempts to smooth income over its life, the effect on consumption
during the period when the benefits are received is tiny. For the
Joneses, who are able to borrow or dip into past savings, the UI
benefits represent a transitory increase in income that, like other
such increases, raises consumption slightly each year of the
household's remaining life.
Now consider the Cohens, a household identical to the Joneses,
except that they cannot borrow and have no savings to draw upon
during the year when their income is only $5,000. Even though
their lifetime income is the same as the Joneses', their
consumption is drastically reduced, from $8,000 to $5,000 during
that year. How will they spend the $1,000 of UI benefits? In their
case it would make sense to spend every penny of it. Even if they
do this, their consumption will only be $6,000, far less than the
$8,000 of goods consumed in earlier years of their lives or than the
$8,000 consumed later. Spending the entire $1,000 helps to smooth
consumption across the household's life. If they saved part of it
they would increase consumption during later periods, when it is
already high, at the expense of current consumption, when it is
abnormally low.
6. For example, see the theoretical arguments, empirical evidence, and references in
Munnell (1976).
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For the Joneses, it may be concluded that UI benefits are more
than adequate as judged by the objective standard of how they are
spent. Because the Joneses can borrow or dip into savings, the UI
benefits are hardly spent at all. The story is different for the
Cohens: they spend all the UI benefits they receive. Furthermore,
even if they get $3,000 in benefits, they would spend it all, for they
would still then be consuming only $8,000 per year. For the
Cohens, the $1,000 in UI benefits are inadequate, in the sense that
the amount is insufficient to enable them to maintain their
standard of living (at $8,000 per year). The benefits are inadequate
both because they are meager compared to the size of the lost
income, but also because the household, for whatever reasons,
does not have access to borrowed funds or past savings.
The view of benefit adequacy implicit in this discussion is
fundamentally different from that contained in the many studies
of the subject. 7 In these works, the authors identify certain
expenditure categories as being "necessary and obligated" or
"nondeferrable" and define benefit adequacy in terms of the
fraction of such expenditures that other income and UI benefits
can cover. One difficulty with that method is that it is necessarily
arbitrary in its selection of commodities. Also, it ignores the
possibility that households that dip into savings to meet periods of
unemployment are not facing hardship, but are instead using
savings that were set aside in the expectation of future
unemployment. For such households, there is no hardship from
unemployment, for they are able to maintain their standard of
living. Benefits would be considered inadequate for such
households in the existing benefit adequacy literature; by the
criterion of this study, though, they are more than adequate, since
the household has its own means of maintaining its consumption.
One obviously cannot take households out of a sample of data
and point out some as being more like the Joneses and others as
more like the Cohens. However, the discussion suggests that
7. Becker (1961) analyzed the behavior of households surveyed by the Department of
Labor in the studies of the 1950s. Blaustein and Mackin (1977) extended the work using
data for South Carolina. Burgess and Kingston (1978) conducted a major benefit adequacy
study in Arizona using econometric techniques not used in the earlier studies.
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households for which benefits are adequate or more than adequate
will spend each extra dollar of UI benefits to the same extent they
would spend an extra dollar of transitory income. Spending
propensities out of UI benefits will be low for them. Households
for which benefits are inadequate will spend 100 percent of each
extra dollar of benefits. In the entire sample, the propensity to
spend out of UI benefits will be a weighted average of the
consumption behavior of households like the Joneses and the
Cohens. If UI benefits are spent dollar-for-dollar by the average
household, it may be inferred that most households are like the
Cohens and find benefits inadequate; if UI benefits are largely
spent in the same partial way as is transitory income, it may be
inferred that most households, like the Joneses, find benefits at
least adequate.
In addition to allowing an estimate of the fraction of
households for which benefits are inadequate, this approach also
allows an examination of whether the likelihood that benefits are
inadequate varies with identifiable characteristics. In particular,
the theory stated that households that can borrow easily or that
have prior savings are less likely to find benefits inadequate. Since
a cushion of savings and access to loanable funds are likely to be
greater among higher-income households, the study examines
whether spending propensities out of UI are more like those of the
Joneses among higher-income households that receive UI benefits.
Using this approach, it is possible to form some hypotheses
about how UI benefits will affect the consumption of different
goods and services. The recipient household that must reduce its
consumption is faced with the choice of which items to cut back
on. If its members are logical, they will reduce spending on those
goods that were added to their consumption as their living
standards rose. One should expect UI recipients who face reduced
living standards (for whom benefits were inadequate) mainly to
reduce their consumption of luxuries. Comparing UI recipient
households to others, a larger share of total consumption among
UI recipient households would be expected to go for necessities,
and a smaller share for luxuries. While the identification of
luxuries and necessities could be arbitrary, this arbitrariness is
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avoided by identifying as luxuries those goods whose consumption
increases more than proportionally as average household income
rises, and necessities as those whose consumption rises less than
proportionally. 8
Just as UI recipients are likely to reduce spending most on
luxuries, they will respond to additional UI benefits by attempting
to restore their spending on those items—luxuries—that they cut
out during the period of reduced consumption. It is expected that
propensities to spend out of UI benefits will be greatest on luxury
items, smallest on necessities. Paradoxically, UI benefits will be
spent mostly on luxuries, even where recipient households suffer
reduced living standards during times of unemployment.
These considerations suggest several conclusions about the
likely effects of the federal restriction on the receipt of UI by
pensioners. First, if it is found that UI benefits are inadequate for
a substantial fraction of recipient households, it may be concluded
that the fraction would have been higher had the restriction been
in effect. Second, if the likelihood that benefits are inadequate is
greatest for low-income households, this would reduce arguments
against the retirement-income restriction. Chapter 2 showed that
the restriction would reduce benefits least among low-income
households. Finally, if the data confirm the hypotheses about the
pattern of spending out of additional UI benefits, the restriction
can be expected to induce even sharper cutbacks in purchases of
luxury goods by recipient households, as their total income would
be reduced still further when they are unemployed.
Data and Simple Comparisons of
UI Recipient Households and Others
The analysis is based on data from subsamples of households
from the Retirement History Survey responses for 1971 and 1973
(income and spending for 1970 and 1972). For the data covering
8. In what follows, we measure the income elasticity of demand for each commodity, the
percentage response of spending to a 1 percent increase in income, other things equal.
The designation of luxuries as those with income elasticities above one, and necessities as
those elasticities below one, is standard parlance.
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1970 income and consumption, only 3,188 households met the
criterion of having complete and usable information required for
the analysis; for 1972,2,458 households met this criterion. Despite
the very large fraction of households for which data were not
usable in this analysis (remember, 8,928 households were included
in the 1972 RHS), the remaining subsample appears to be fairly
representative of the original sample. In the 1970 subsample, for
example, 90.0 percent of the households are white, 61.9 are
headed by a married male, and 28.8 are headed by a married
female. For the original RHS panel of 11,153 households, the
comparable percentages are 90.0, 60.5 and 28.7, a remarkably
close correspondence. In the subsample for 1972, the figures are
91.7 percent, 63.6 percent and 26.6 percent, indicating a somewhat
greater proportional representation among whites and households
headed by married males. That this occurs is expected: incomplete
responses are least likely among those groups with higher incomes
and higher socioeconomic status, so that whites and two-person
households are more likely to be represented increasingly in the
sample as it ages.
Table 3.1 presents the means and their standard deviations for a
number of household characteristics separately for UI recipient
households and others in the two subsamples. Several of the
measures require some explanation. Non-UI income after taxes
consists of income from all sources other than UI benefits,
adjusted for Social Security and federal personal income taxes. 9
To this sum is added an imputed income from the net value
(market value minus mortgage) on owner-occupied housing. 10 The
"partly retired" and "fully retired" categories are based on the
household head's response to a question that asks him to appraise
his retirement status. It is thus subjective, but probably reflective
9. The income figures used are an approximation to disposable income, derived by
applying the relevant year's data on actual effective rates of the federal personal income
tax, and data on Old Age, Survivors, Disability and Health Insurance payroll tax rates and
ceilings, to all income flows other than UI and retirement income. (See U.S. Department of
the Treasury, Statistics of Income, 1968, 1970, 1972.)
10. The imputation assumes a 6 percent return on the homeowner's equity. While low by
today's standards, this was reasonable in the early 1970s.
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Table 3.1
Selected Characteristics of Older Worker Households, 1970 and 1972
Subsample average 8
1972
1970
UI recip
Characteristic or
UI recip
spending category
ients
Others
ients
Others
Number of households
113
2,345
175
3,013
~
~
$ 954
$ 684
UI benefits
(71)
(43)
Non-UI income
$8,377
$8,787
$7,560
$7,566
(102)
after taxes
(532)
(138)
(325)
61.25
61.41
Age of head
62.89
63.30
(.13)
(.16)
(.04)
(.03)
93.1
Percent white
88.5
89.8
91.9
(3.0)
(.6)
(1.8)
(.6)
73.7
Percent with married
77.0
61.2
63.0
male head
(3.9)
(3.3)
(.9)
(1.0)
Percent with female
15.4
27.1
29.6
15.9
(2.7)
head
(3.5)
(.9)
(.8)
Percent with head
47.0
19.4
31.9
33.6
responding as fully
(4.6)
(1.0)
(2.9)
(.8)
retired
Percent with head
23.9
14.5
18.9
9.6
responding as partly
(4.0)
(.7)
(2.9)
(.5)
retired
Percent of after-tax
income spent on:
—
—
Food b
15.51
15.58
6.48
5.12
Transportation0
5.90
5.03
3.40
Vacations and trips
2.58
2.74
3.06
Housing
23.54
23.25
21.77
22.43
a. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.
b. Food is excluded for 1970 because the raw data were unavailable.
c. Includes gasoline in 1972.
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of how close an attachment to the labor force he has, at least as
compared to the alternative response, "not retired."
Before comparing the sample means of the characteristics for
the two groups of households in each subsample, it is worth noting
that the amount of UI benefits per recipient household in the 1970
subsample is almost identical to the $695 for the (larger) 1970
subsample used in chapter 2. The same measure for the 1972
subsample is smaller here than the $1,143 reported in table 2.1;
however, the difference is not quite significant given the size of the
standard deviation of the mean benefits. 11 These considerations
reinforce the conclusion about the representativeness of these
subsamples.
Despite the small size of the sample of UI recipient households,
significant differences are found between the means of some of
their characteristics and those of households that do not contain
UI recipients. For example, in both subsamples the households in
which someone receives UI are significantly more likely to be
headed by a married male, significantly less likely to be headed by
a single female, and (inferentially) equally likely to be headed by a
single male. That households headed by married men comprise a
disproportionate share of UI recipient households in the sample is
not surprising: such households are much more likely to contain
more than one person, and thus more than one potential UI
recipient. What is interesting is that households headed by single
males have roughly the same shares among UI recipient
households and others, while those headed by single females are
underrepresented among UI recipient households. This corrob
orates data on the entire UI program for individual recipients
showing women to be a smaller fraction of recipients than of the
labor force (see Hamermesh 1977, p. 22).
11. The standard deviation for the test of the difference between two sample means is:

where N, and N 2 are the numbers of observations in each sample, and Si and S: are the
standard deviations of the means in each sample.
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In the 1972 subsample, the heads of UI recipient households are
significantly younger than those of other households. This
undoubtedly reflects the increased likelihood of withdrawal from
the labor force (and thus the lesser likelihood that the household
head is eligible for UI benefits) as the head ages. They are also less
likely than others to report themselves as fully retired, again
probably reflecting the fact that the fully retired person is not
likely to have established eligibility for UI based on recent prior
work. That many UI recipients do state they are fully retired may
reflect such work or it may just reflect fuzziness in responses to the
question in the survey. What is interesting, though, and crucial to
the consideration of the restriction on the receipt of UI by
pensioners, is that the heads of households that receive UI income
are more likely than others to report themselves as partly retired.
This relationship, which is considered in much more detail in
chapter 4, suggests that a substantial amount of UI benefits
accruing to older workers goes to those with a fairly weak labor
force attachment.
For 1972, the original data allow the construction of
observations on spending on food, transportation and gasoline,
vacations and trips, and housing. 12 While data on other categories
would be nice to have, they are not available in the RHS in usable
form. Together these four consumption categories comprised 48
percent of average after-tax income in the sample. The same
fraction of after-tax income is spent by both groups on these four
categories combined. However, table 3.1 shows that UI recipients
allocate a substantially greater fraction of their total income to
12. Expenditures on food were calculated by multiplying by 52 the respondent's reported
usual weekly expenditures on food, as was spending on transportation. (The use of usual
expenditures circumvents any problems of seasonality.) Gasoline expenditures were
estimated by multiplying by 12 the reported monthly spending. "Housing" spending is an
amalgam of blown-up monthly rent or mortgage and taxes, plus annual spending on
utilities and other housing services, plus 6 percent of the net value of owner-occupied
housing. Finally, vacations and trips expenditure is the amount the respondent reported as
spending on this category. Clearly, these categories are not consistent with one another, but
they appear to be the most sensible, given the way the data are reported in the Survey. To
the extent there are errors in the reporting of these data, the significance of our results will
be reduced; conversely, if we find significant results, we may infer that the errors are not
too serious.
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transportation and gasoline. This difference, though probably not
significant, is what one would expect if the UI recipients devote a
large part of their time to job search that involves the use of autos
or public transportation. 13 Conversely, they spend proportionately
less on vacations and trips. Of course, these percentages may
differ because average incomes differ between UI recipient
households and others. The regression analysis of the next section
will examine this issue.
The consumption data for 1970 contained so many errors in the
category for food expenditure that only three commodity groups
could be used—transportation, vacations and trips, and housing
expenditures. (With the exception of the deletion of gasoline from
the first of these three, the categories are measured exactly as in
the 1972 data.) Table 3.1 shows the shares of these three categories
in the after-tax incomes of UI recipients and others: spending as a
fraction of total income is again about the same in both groups,
and again UI recipients spend proportionately more on
transportation and less on vacations and trips.
One might well object that the small number of recipient
households and likely errors in reporting of consumption by
category make any inferences from these data very shaky. The
validity of this objection is testable: if it is found that there are
systematic differences between spending propensities out of UI
and other income, or that consumption as measured is related to
income, it may be inferred that the data are reliable.
The major goal of this chapter is to deduce from the data the
fraction of older households whose propensity to spend out of UI
benefits implies that the benefits are inadequate for them. To do
that, it is necessary to estimate relationships, through multiple
regression equations, of each household's spending for each
category to its income from UI benefits and all other sources. The
13. Barren and Mellow (1979) find that UI recipients spend less time engaged in job search
than do other unemployed workers. However, since the overwhelming majority of people
in our sample who do not receive UI benefits are also not unemployed, and presumably not
searching, we may conclude that the average UI recipient spends more time searching for
work that the average person in the sample.
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coefficients from these regressions are in fact the marginal
propensities to spend out of income from the particular source.
The previous section of this essay suggested that the fraction of
households for which spending is inadequate can be inferred by
comparing spending propensities out of UI to those out of
permanent and transitory income. These two theoretical concepts
are hard to measure in practice; however, having several years of
data on incomes in each household makes it possible to attempt
such measurement. Essentially, it is assumed that permanent
income in nonrecipient households is the average of income in the
current year and that observed when the subsample was
interviewed two years earlier. Thus, for example, for the 1970
subsample, it is the average of the household's incomes in 1968
and 1970. Transitory income is then estimated as the deviation of
actual from permanent income. The procedure is more complex
for UI recipient households, as shown in Appendix B, but it is
based on the same idea.
For each nonrecipient household, there are measures of
permanent and transitory income; for each recipient household,
there are these plus a measure of its UI benefits. These measures
can then be used in the regression analysis to estimate the spending
propensities to be examined. (The exact equations used are shown
in Appendix B.) Because it is likely that the choice of how much to
spend on different items is affected as well by factors other than
the various income flows, a number of demographic and
work-status variables are also included in the estimating
equations. Demographic variables include the household head's
race, sex, marital status and age, and the number of children living
in the household. Included as work-status measures are variables
indicating whether the head is fully retired, partly retired, or not
retired. Clearly, other control variables might be included, and, in
fact, others were tried. As the results for them in Appendix B
suggest, though, these particular variables are important in
explaining variations among households in patterns of con
sumption.
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Evidence on the Effect of UI
and Other Income on Consumption
Before discussing the estimates of spending propensities out of
permanent and transitory income, spending propensities among
UI recipient households should be considered. Table 3.2 presents
the estimated marginal propensities to spend in each category out
of UI and other income. In addition, marginal spending
propensities on the total of the several categories are also included.
In both 1970 and 1972, propensities to spend out of UI are found
to exceed those out of other income in most cases. It was noted
earlier that spending out of UI by households for which benefits
are inadequate will exceed marginal spending propensities out of
permanent income, while, for households for which UI is
adequate, spending propensities out of UI will be lower. Since the
estimated propensities to spend out of UI on all categories
combined are fairly large compared to those out of other income,
it may be concluded that at least some fraction of the recipient
households finds UI benefits inadequate. It is also worth noting
that, despite the relatively small number of households receiving
UI, many of the marginal spending propensities are positive and
are significantly different from zero. This should enhance one's
confidence in the reliability of the data, and thus in the results of
estimates using these data, as it implies that the consumption data
are not simply random.
Table 3.3 presents the estimates of the propensities to spend out
of permanent and transitory income in each year for all
households in the subsamples. Some comment is required about
the estimated spending propensities themselves. As the theory
predicts, spending propensities out of permanent income exceed
those out of transitory income, suggesting that these are measured
with some accuracy. Worth noting too are some interesting
differences between the marginal propensities and the shares of
income spent on each commodity that were shown in table 3.1.
Even though transportation (transportation and gasoline in 1972)
takes a larger share of after-tax income than do vacations and
trips, marginal propensities to spend on vacations and trips are
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greater. This is consistent with the expectation that vacations are a
luxury good that becomes more important only as income
increases. An even stronger comparison between food and
vacations in the 1972 subsample reinforces this point.
Table 3.2
Estimates of Marginal Spending Propensities Out of UI and Other
Income, UI Recipient Households, 1970 and 1972
Marginal propensity to spend out of: a
1972, N = 113
1970, N = 175
UI
Spending
Other
Other
UI
income
income
income
category
income
~
~
Food b
.0417*
.1190*
(3.45)
(1.34)
Transportation 0
-.0153
.0285*
.0229*
-.0437
(3.47)
(-.33)
(2.53)
(-.53)
.1418*
Vacations
.0360*
.0520*
.0591
and trips
(2.83)
(7.37)
(5.05)
(1.13)
Housing
.1017*
.1291*
.1129
.4035*
(3.25)
(6.11)
(5.82)
(.73)

All three
categories
(four in 1972)

.1766*
(8.70)

.5299*
(3.67)

.2352*
(7.78)

.2474
(1.11)

a. t-statistics, ratios of the spending propensities to their standard errors, are in parentheses
below the estimated spending propensities.
b. Food is excluded for 1970 because the raw data were unavailable.
c. Includes gasoline in 1972.
*The spending propensity is different from zero at the 90 percent level of confidence.

The major points of interest and probably the most important
findings of this chapter are the estimates of the fractions of
households whose spending out of UI suggests that benefits are
inadequate. In the 1970 subsample, it is estimated that hardly any
of the households find benefits inadequate; only 5 percent of the
UI recipient households appear to spend as if UI benefits were
inadequate. In the 1972 subsample, it is estimated that 60 percent
of UI recipient households spend as if benefits were inadequate.
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(See Appendix B for a discussion of the derivation of these
estimates.) These estimates are substantially different, probably
because of the relatively few households with UI income in the
subsamples. They do suggest, though, that perhaps a majority of
older UI recipient households finds benefits adequate in the sense
that UI benefits, together possibly with prior savings and
borrowed funds, are sufficient to prevent consumption from
declining. They also imply that a reduction in UI benefits for
pensioners will not reduce the living standards of almost a
majority of older households in the sample, or, by inference, in
the entire population.
Table 3.3
Estimates of Marginal Spending Propensities, Out of Permanent and
Transitory Income, All Households, 1970 and 1972
Marginal propensity to spend out of: a
1972, N = 2458
1970, N = 3188
Spending
Permanent Transitory Permanent Transitory
income
income
income
category
income
~
~
-.0008
.0581*
Foodb
(-.11)
(23.96)
.0422*
.0403*
.0215*
Transportation 0
.0358*
(5.02)
(14.52)
(2.51)
(13.93)
-.0079*
.0124*
.0622*
Vacations
.0527*
(1.46)
(22.20)
and trips
(-1.38)
(30.60)
.1333*
.1640*
Housing
.0222*
.1900*
(8.39)
(31.21)
(1.49)
(42.56)

All three
categories
(four in 1972)

.2784*
(51.02)

.0367*
(2.03)

.3246*
(46.55)

.1874*
(8.90)

a. t-statistics, ratios of the spending propensities to their standard errors, are in parentheses
below the estimated spending propensities.
b. Food is excluded for 1970 because the raw data were unavailable.
c. Includes gasoline in 1972.
*The spending propensity is different from zero at the 90 percent level of confidence.
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While it is interesting to know the percentage of households that
appear to have inadequate UI benefits, it is more useful for the
analysis of the retirement-income restriction to know how this
percentage differs among households with different incomes. It
was noted earlier that the ability to borrow and the likelihood of
having past savings would tend to ensure that higher-income
households are more able to maintain consumption during periods
of unemployment. On the other hand, low-income UI recipient
households, where weekly earnings are likely to be low, may have
a greater fraction of their lost earnings replaced by UI than
higher-income households because of state benefit maxima. The
net effect is an empirical question, the answer to which is provided
by methods described in Appendix B. The results of applying these
methods are presented in table 3.4 for a range of permanent
incomes that includes over 90 percent of the households in each
subsample. They show unequivocally that, in both subsamples,
the probability that a UI recipient household spends its income as
if benefits are inadequate—in the sense that they are unable to
maintain consumption—is greatest among low-income house
holds. (The differences between the two years, and between these
estimates and the average figures quoted above, which are based
on equation B.3 in Appendix B, are again the result of sample
variation—the number of recipient households is relatively small.)
This suggests that it is the lack of access to borrowed funds or past
savings that is the major determinant of whether a household can
maintain consumption during periods of unemployment, given
that UI benefits replace only part of lost earnings.
One might argue that this finding is not surprising, to say the
least: low-income households consume less, so it is natural that
they are more likely to find benefits inadequate. Such an argument
completely misses the point. Benefit adequacy has been defined in
terms of the relation between living standards during unemploy
ment compared to those when household members are at work.
This says nothing per se about absolute levels of consumption, but
instead deals with potential shortfalls of consumption among the
unemployed. What the findings in table 3.4 show is that these
shortfalls from usual consumption are most likely among
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households whose incomes are lowest even when the members are
employed.
Table 3.4
Estimated Percent of UI Recipient Households With Inadequate UI
Benefits, at Selected Levels of Permanent Income, 1970 and 1972
Percent with inadequate benefits a
1972
Permanent income
1970
99.99
57.0
$ 2,500
99.97
5,000
16.2
—
7,543 b
2.3
...
99.85
8,756 C
97.6
.1
15,000
69.2
25,000
.01

Total subsample d
a.
b.
c.
d.

5.0

60.0

Inadequate as defined in the text.
1970 mean permanent income.
1972 mean permanent income.
Based on equation B-3 in Appendix B.

Earlier in the discussion, it was deduced that households in
which persons receive UI benefits will spend those benefits
disproportionately on luxury items. To examine whether this in
fact occurs, it is first necessary to know which items are luxuries
and which are necessities. Table 3.5 shows for each year the
percentage increase in spending by category in response to a 1
percent increase in permanent income. (These responses are based
on the estimated marginal spending propensities out of permanent
income by all households shown in table 3.3.) 14 "Vacations and
trips" is the only luxury category, where "luxury" is defined as a
category for which the percentage increase exceeds one. Food
appears to be the most basic necessity (lowest percentage) among
the four categories examined, with housing and transportation
intermediate between food and vacations. Neither our classifica
tion nor the relative ranking of spending categories as luxuries or
necessities seems to conflict with commonly-held notions.
14. These responses (income elasticities) are calculated at the means of each spending
measure and the measure of permanent income.

Table 3.5
Percentage Change in Spending by Category With One Percent Increase in Permanent Income, and Relative
Responsiveness to Additional UI Benefits, 1970 and 1972
1972
1970
(1)
(2)
(4)
(3)
Relative
Relative
Percentage increase
responsiveness
Percentage increase
responsiveness
in spending
in spending
to added UI income
to added UI income
(All households)
(UI recipient
(All households)
(UI recipient
Spending category
households)
households)
~
~
.37
98
Food 3
.70
102
94
Transportation b
.68
1.70
1.84
126
Vacations and trips
127
.70
99
Housing
.83
96
All categories
100
combined
.91
100
1.00
a. Food is excluded for 1970 because the raw data were unavailable,
b. Includes gasoline in 1972.

a.

O
o
p
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c
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»•»
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Columns (2) and (4) of table 3.5 list values of an index showing
the relative responsiveness of spending in each category to the
receipt of additional UI benefits. (The method of computing this
index is discussed in Appendix B.) A comparison of columns (1)
and (2), and (3) and (4), provides a striking confirmation of the
hypothesis on how UI affects consumption among older workers.
In 1972 the index is greatest for vacations and trips, the category
that has the highest response of spending to additional permanent
income. This indicates that UI benefits are spent disproportion
ately more on this luxury category. The index is below 100 for all
three other categories; this demonstrates that relatively little of the
extra UI benefits is allocated to these necessity categories. In the
1970 subsample, though there are only three categories to
compare, the same behavior seems to exist: spending out of
additional UI benefits is greatest on the luxury item, vacations and
trips. Thus, while the sizes of the responses differ, additional UI
benefits in both subsamples are spent disproportionately on
luxuries.
Table 3.1 showed that UI recipient households spend a greater
fraction of their after-tax incomes on necessities than do other
households. The earlier predictions are thus completely corrob
orated: UI recipient households that are forced to cut
consumption do so by cutting out luxuries; this shows up as a
reduced share of luxuries in total spending. If given additional UI
benefits, and thus the chance to restore part of their reduced
consumption, the analysis presented in table 3.5 indicates that they
spend most of the higher UI benefits on the luxury items that were
cut out.
How would a reduction in UI benefits resulting from the
retirement-income restriction affect the pattern of spending on
commodities? It should be noted first that, because the restriction
would bear most heavily upon higher-income households (see
chapter 2), and because higher-income households usually find
benefits adequate and are not likely to suffer reduced
consumption (see above), the effects of the restriction are likely to
be quite small. To the extent they arise, though, the implication is
that spending on luxuries would bear the brunt of any reduction in
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spending: it has been shown empirically that UI recipient
households that must cut spending do so (rationally) by reducing
spending on luxuries.
Conclusions and Inferences
Having examined in chapter 2 what a retirement-income
restriction would do to the distribution of income in the older
population, it was intended in this chapter to examine whether the
restriction would impose hardship, in the form of sharp reductions
in consumption. In order to do this, it was necessary to measure
the fraction of older households for whom unemployment now
represents a hardship, in the sense that the household is forced to
reduce consumption because UI benefits, along with savings or
borrowed funds, are inadequate to maintain spending. Whether
such reductions are more likely to be observed among higher- or
lower-income households was also examined. Finally, the data
were analyzed to see whether those households that are forced to
reduce consumption cut their spending on luxuries or on
necessities; clearly, if necessities were cut out one would have to
view the inadequacy of benefits, and the reduction in UI benefits
that would result from the retirement-income restriction, as more
serious.
Using subsamples of UI recipient and other households from
the Retirement History Survey for 1970 and 1972, spending
propensities out of UI benefits were examined and compared to
spending out of other forms of income. While the results differ
between the two subsamples, this comparison allowed the
inference that, at most, half of the households in which UI is
received find benefits inadequate. For at least half, it can be
inferred from their spending behavior that savings, borrowed
funds, UI benefits, or some combination of the three are sufficient
to prevent reductions in consumption. From the estimates it can be
concluded that those older households that must reduce
consumption—for which benefits are inadequate as the term was
defined—are more likely to be households in which income is low
even when all labor force participants in the household are

56

UI and Consumption

employed. Finally, and perhaps somewhat consolingly, those
households that are forced to reduce consumption during periods
of unemployment appear to do so chiefly by reducing spending on
the luxuries they had been consuming. Obversely, if given
additional UI benefits, they would restore their total consumption
by increasing spending particularly on the luxuries they had cut
out.
Although maintaining consumption is an important goal of UI,
it is only one of the things the program is aimed at. Conclusions
about the desirability of the retirement-income restriction cannot
be drawn solely on the basis of findings in this chapter, as they
relate to only one of the program's goals. Nonetheless, the
findings do provide some suggestions that should be considered
when conclusions for policy are drawn (chapter 5). (1) That the
majority of households finds benefits to be adequate implies that
one should not be extremely concerned that the restriction will
impose still greater burdens on most older households. (2) Even
among those households that must reduce consumption when
unemployed, the reduction is mainly in their spending on goods
one would classify as luxuries. Thus the restriction, and the
implied reduction in UI benefit payments it entails, will not
seriously affect spending on necessities by those households which
will be forced to cut consumption. (3) Unfortunately, the greater
likelihood of reductions in consumption among low-income
households that occur when a household member is unemployed
means that, to the extent that the restriction reduces benefits
accruing to low-income households, its effects will be more severe.
Even though UI was not originally intended as a program aimed at
equalizing incomes, it has accreted some features (benefit maxima
and, in some states, higher replacement rates for earnings losses of
low-wage workers) that in fact make it do this to some extent.
Given this de facto goal, one should be concerned in drawing
policy conclusions that potential detrimental effects on lowincome households be minor.

Chapter 4
Unemployment Insurance and
Retirement: Work Incentive
or Disincentive, Windfall
or Discouragement
Introduction
The issue in this chapter is how UI affects the labor market
behavior of older people. The numerous studies of its effects on
the supply side of the labor market (see Hamermesh 1977) have
pointed out how it might in general: (1) Increase the duration of
spells of unemployment; (2) Induce more frequent spells of
unemployment; and (3) Induce workers loosely attached to the
labor force to spend more time in the labor force, both time
employed and time unemployed. In the population of workers 55
and over, a fourth effect of UI—a changed probability of
permanent labor force withdrawal—becomes a relevant possibil
ity. The purpose of this chapter is to analyze this possibility using
the data from the Retirement History Survey.
As the title of the chapter indicates, there are four possible ways
that the payment of UI benefits to older persons might be related
to their probability of retirement. First, the receipt of UI payments
might induce a postponement of retirement that increases
production of goods and services in the economy. By providing
older, unemployed workers with a payment whose continued
receipt is contingent upon continued labor force attachment, the
UI program might maintain their attachment even after they
exhaust UI benefits. This incentive effect might work by giving the
older UI recipient the means of financing productive job search
that might otherwise not have been undertaken. (However, as
shown in the previous chapter, by inference the majority of older
recipients appear to have funds for this purpose.) Second, UI may
provide a disincentive effect. Older UI recipients who might
57
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otherwise have remained in the labor force after they finish
receiving benefits might find the leisure-time activities engaged in
while receiving benefits to be more enjoyable than anticipated.
This discovery may induce them to refuse subsequent job offers
that they might otherwise have accepted.
UI benefits may induce no change in the behavior of older
recipients. Instead, they may merely increase the income of part of
the older population without changing the amount of time the UI
recipient spends employed. This is especially likely where UI
benefits are paid with little monitoring of job search activities of
recipients. In this third case, UI is a windfall for those older
workers who receive it; there is no effect on the recipient's labor
market behavior, nor does the individual's unemployment
experience lead him to change his retirement plans. Fourth, the
person who received UI may become discouraged about his job
prospects and retire. Like the windfall effect, this too implies that
UI is not being used to finance job search that will pay off, and
unlike the disincentive effect, the receipt of UI benefits induces no
change in retirement behavior. Rather, and unlike the windfall
effect, the experience of unemployment causes the worker to
revise his plans and retire rather than continue looking for work.
The next section analyzes these effects in more detail and
considers how they may be distinguished from one another
empirically. Subsamples are then formed from the Retirement
History Survey, their characteristics are discussed, and use of the
data to estimate the impact of UI benefits on retirement behavior
among older recipients is described. The estimates of the effect of
the amount of benefits received on the probability that an older
worker is not in the labor force, or states he is retired, are then
considered and discussed, and the implications for the
retirement-income restriction are considered in the concluding
section.
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Issues in Estimating the Relation
of UI to Retirement Status

The potential incentive and disincentive effects of UI benefits
upon the older worker's decision to retire flow from the same
arguments made elsewhere (Hamermesh 1977) about the effects of
UI on recipients' unemployment duration. These are: (1) The
incentive effect—an induced reduction in the length of spells of
unemployment—that would arise if UI benefits enable recipients
to search for work more efficiently and if that search results in
their finding jobs more quickly than they otherwise would; and
(2) The disincentive effect—an induced increase in the length of
spells of unemployment—that would occur if the benefits reduce
the recipient's desire to return to work. Both of these effects may
be operating, though the abundant empirical research suggests the
disincentive effect is greater for most recipients. On net, UI
benefits increase the duration of spells of unemployment. l
These two alternative effects would be relatively unimportant
for older workers if they acted only during the particular spell of
unemployment that is compensated by UI benefits. They need not
be small, though, for the older worker if the inducement they
provide is coupled with stickiness of workers' decisions about
whether to participate in the labor force. It is known, for example,
that those in the labor force are very likely to stay in, and that
those who leave the labor force are likely to stay out. Any
incentive provided by UI that makes the job search more effective
will thus induce long-lasting effects in postponing retirement.
Conversely, any disincentive it gives that lengthens unemployment
spells or makes job-finding slower can induce long term increases
in the probability of being retired. The potential effects, coupled
with stickiness in labor force behavior, may be rather substantial. 2
1. Hamermesh (1977) shows that the strong consensus of past work is that UI induces a net
increase in the duration of unemployment, though there is less agreement about its
magnitude.
2. While this notion is probably unimportant for prime-age males, it has been
demonstrated by Heckman (1977) to be important as a description of the dynamics of labor
supply among married women. Heckman and Willis (1977) also show that such stickiness
exists for married women, and, we may infer, for other groups in which the average
participation rate is not very high.
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The incentive effect is a positive, causative relation between the
amount of UI benefits (or UI recipient status) and the older
recipient's subsequent decision to remain in the labor force. The
disincentive is a negative, causative relation between these same
observable phenomena. Both imply that UI induces a change in
behavior from what would have occurred had the benefits not
been received. Insofar as the older UI recipient also receives
retirement income, the proposed retirement-income restriction
would induce changes in retirement patterns if it became effective:
it would increase retirement rates if UI currently provides older
workers an incentive to stay in the labor force, and would decrease
them if the major effect is now a disincentive to remain in the
labor force.
The third possibility is that UI induces no change in retirement
behavior, but that it functions as a windfall accruing to workers
who have already decided to retire. There is good reason for an
older person who wishes to retire to seek to use UI benefits in this
manner. First, most older workers did not expect the rates of price
increase that have occurred in the past fifteen years and are very
interested in taking any extra transfer income they can to increase
consumption toward what it would have been had they been able
to anticipate inflation better. Second, the Social Security system
offers some slight inducements to postpone the initial receipt of
benefits. The primary insurance amount is reduced somewhat if
one begins receiving benefits between ages 62 and 64, and is
increased very slightly if benefits are delayed beyond age 65. 3
Thus, if the receipt of UI enables the worker to postpone receiving
Social Security benefits, it will increase his per-period, though
probably not his lifetime, amount of such benefits received. 4
3. In 1973, a person who began drawing Social Security benefits at age 62 received on
average 80 percent of the monthly payment he would have received at age 65. Conversely, if
he waited until age 68 to claim benefits, his monthly benefit would be 3 percent higher than
what it would have been had he retired at age 65. (Social Security Administration, Social
Security Handbook, 1973.)
4. Even ignoring discounting, a person who retired in 1973 at age 65 would have to live
beyond age 77 in order to accumulate as large a lifetime retirement benefit as would accrue
to someone who retired at age 62. Thus it is unlikely that this effect will be very great, but
its direction is nonetheless clear.
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The existence of the windfall effect would imply that the receipt
of UI benefits does not change retirement behavior among older
UI recipients, and thus that a retirement-income restriction on UI
benefits also would not. Nonetheless, the windfall effect would
have substantial implications for the UI program and for a
restriction. For example, it would mean that some older UI
recipients draw benefits with no intention of seeking work, but
instead view the benefits as a supplemental form of retirement
income. Unless claims officers are clever at enforcing workseeking requirements, the older recipient who wishes to use UI
benefits to cushion his entry into retirement can succeed in what
amounts to an illegitimate use of the system. (It is illegitimate
because the recipient is not really available for work.) These
considerations would argue in favor of a restriction as a way of
circumventing the difficulty in discerning who is truly available for
work.
The windfall effect implies a negative relation between the
amount of UI benefits (or recipient status) and subsequent
decisions to remain in the labor force. This relationship is not a
causative one, but it is in the same direction as that implied by the
disincentive effect. As such, the disincentive and windfall effects
will be difficult to distinguish from one another, as both will lead
us to observe that higher recent UI benefits are associated with
higher current probability of being retired. One way to make a
distinction is to use the possible interaction between UI and
postponed filing for Social Security benefits to make some
inferences about which effect is the more likely. In particular,
there can be no interaction before age 62, since workers below age
62 are ineligible for Social Security. Thus, if UI payments serve to
postpone receipt of Social Security among those 62 and over, one
should observe a greater effect of UI on retirement among those
62 and over than among those younger. It could then be inferred
that the windfall effect is important. If no differences in the effects
of UI by age are observed, it may be concluded that there is no
postponement motive, and thus that the disincentive effect is
important. (Clearly, if no relationship is observed between UI
recipient status or benefits received and retirement status, it must
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be inferred that neither the windfall nor the disincentive effect has
empirical support.)
If a positive relation is found between UI recipient status, or
total benefits received, and a subsequent greater likelihood of
being out of the labor force or retired, it may be inferred that the
disincentive or windfall effect is important. A skeptic would
argue, though, that this merely shows that the older unemployed
worker is out of the labor force because of the unavailability of
jobs rather than because he has chosen to retire. This
discouragement relation between receipt of UI benefits and
subsequent labor force status may exist. One way of controlling
for the problem is to hold constant the individual's labor force
status in the year prior to the receipt of UI benefits. This would
account for any inherent differences in attitudes toward work that
may affect individuals' labor force attachment.
A second approach followed here is to consider the kinds of
workers whose retirement behavior is more likely to be affected by
the receipt of UI benefits (if there is a disincentive effect), or who
are more likely to retire in the expectation of receiving a windfall
in the form of UI benefits as they start their retirement. If
something more than the lack of available jobs is producing the
relation between UI benefits and subsequent retirement status, it
should be most important for workers whose prior attachment
was to firms that were not effectively experience rated. In such
firms, it costs the employer nothing in UI taxes to lay the older
worker off and have him receive UI benefits as he moves into
retirement. Indeed, the employer benefits as other workers, seeing
such a "golden handshake" being offered, become more willing to
work for him. In firms that are effectively experience rated, this
behavior will not occur frequently, as it costs the employer
something to do it. If a relation between UI benefits and
subsequent retirement is found, it can thus be determined whether
it is caused by the disincentive or windfall effects, or by the lack of
job availability, by examining how the relation differs depending
upon the worker's prior industry attachment.
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Data Used and Other Factors Affecting
the Impact of UI on Subsequent Retirement
As is done throughout this monograph, here too subsamples are
formed from the Retirement History Survey to test the
hypotheses. Because the ideas are explicitly based on comparing
receipt of UI at one point to retirement status later, and to hold
constant for earlier labor force attachment, the longitudinal
nature of the RHS is invaluable. However, unlike the analyses in
chapters 2 and 3 which focused properly on household behavior,
the individual is the appropriate object of attention in studying
retirement, since it is the individual who retires or works. (As will
be seen, though, his decision may be affected by circumstances in
the household.)
Because a substantial body of research has shown that
retirement behavior of married men differs fundamentally from
that of single men and women, the analysis concentrates on the
former group only. 5 This narrows somewhat the applicability of
the findings, but the price is worth paying to ensure that the results
are not rendered meaningless because they do not appropriately
embody the behavior of any single group in testing the hypotheses.
The sample is also confined to white married men, as some recent
evidence suggests an extraordinary fraction of older nonwhite
males retires on disability payments, and thus that their behavior
too differs fundamentally from that of white married males. 6
Subsamples are formed from the 1971 and 1973 waves of the
RHS. The sample restrictions result in 1,664 married men ages
60-64 in 1971, and 2,060 married white men ages 62-67 in 1973. 7
5. Irelan et al. (1976) present evidence from the Retirement History Survey that shows how
greatly retirement behavior differs among married men, single men, and single women.
Clark, Kreps, and Spengler (1978) document the determinants of retirement and their
different effects among various demographic groups.
6. See Siskind (1975) for evidence on the impact of disability payments on participation
rates of older nonwhite males.
7. Workers age 65 in the 1971 RHS are excluded from the subsample for that year so that
our results can reflect behavior that is based exclusively on persons not yet eligible for full
OASI benefits.
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Table 4.1 presents a breakdown of each group by age. Of the 1971
subsample, 115 drew Ul in 1970; 98 of the 1973 group drew Ul in
1972. Clearly, the number of Ul recipients in the subsamples is
small. Whether this is a drawback can be judged by whether or not
the number is large enough to produce a significant relation
between the amount of Ul benefits received, or recipient status,
and subsequent probabilities of being employed or being retired.
As in the two previous chapters, one might question whether the
subsamples of white married males are representative of the entire
RHS, and thus of such men in the entire older population in the
United States. No claims are made that the subsamples represent
unmarried men, nonwhites or women, so that the results can only
be applied to gauging the impact of policy on white married men.
However, some comparisons suggest strongly that the subsamples
are quite representative. For example, 39.9 percent of the 1971
subsample had 12 or more years of schooling compared to 37.9
percent for all men in the 1971 RHS; 16.7 percent had at least
some college, as compared to 16.5 percent in the RHS (see Irelan
et al. 1976). These figures are very close, and the differences are
consistent with the exclusion of blacks and unmarried men.
Similarly, 30.4 percent of the men in the 1971 subsample reported
in 1969 that their health interfered with their work, compared to
35.0 in the RHS. This too is a fairly close correspondence, with the
differences again likely caused by the exclusion of blacks and
unmarried men (see footnote 6).
As another set of checks on the representativeness of the
sample, consider the sample statistics shown in table 4.1 on the
percent of individuals in the labor force. This decreases with age,
as one should expect. Moreover, except for workers 65-67 in 1973,
it is close to that reported for white males in the 1970 Census;
white married males ages 60-64 had a labor force participation rate
of 77.4 percent in the 1970 Census, somewhat above the sample
average of 71.5 percent for 1971 shown in table 4.1. Moreover, the
lower percentage in the labor force among those 62-64 in 1973
than in 1971 is consistent with the size of the observed decline in
participation of older workers in the labor force generally during
this period. The only serious inconsistency with published data is

Table 4.1
Labor Force Participation, Retirement Status, and UI Experience of White Married Males, 1971 and 1973'
UI experience in previous year
Self-reported
Received UI
retirement status
Average
amount
Percent
Percent
Percent
Percent in
Number
per
of
partly
fully
labor
in
recipient
subsample
Number
retired
retired
force
subsample
1971
$ 718
6.9
1,664
71.5
Total
24.2
6.4
115
(58)
(0.6)
(0.6)
(1.1)
(1.0)
638
7.4
53
3.6
13.8
82.2
720
Ages 60-61
(77)
(0.9)
(0.6)
(1.0)
(1.4)
784
6.6
62
8.6
32.1
944
63.3
Ages 62-64
(83)
(0.8)
(0.9)
(1.5)
(1.5)
1973
4.8
$1,012
12.5
98
45.1
50.9
2,060
Total
(76)
(0.6)
(1.1)
(0.7)
(1.1)
1,017
5.7
64
9.6
36.2
60.1
1,119
Ages 62-64
(99)
(0.8)
(1.4)
(0.9)
(1.5)
1,003
3.6
34
15.9
27.3
68.3
941
Ages 65-67
(115)
(0.7)
(1.5)
(1.2)
(1.5)
a. Standard deviations of the means are in parentheses.
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that in the 1970 Census the labor force participation rate of white
married males 65-69 was 41.7 percent, far above that in the 1973
subsample for those 65-67, the younger group in this five-year age
range. 8
The measure of labor force status presented in table 4.1 is based
on questions like those used in the Current Population Survey. It
forms one of the foci of our discussion of the effects of prior
receipt of UI benefits. However, the person's subjective report on
his retirement status may be an equally interesting measure of
whether he is really seeking work. Accordingly, the same measure
is used as in chapter 3, namely, the individual's self-reported
retirement status. The possible responses are that the person is
fully retired, partly retired, or not retired. From these, measures
are formed of: (1) Whether the person is fully retired or not; and
(2) Whether he is partly retired or not. (Since they are based on
different questions, they do not necessarily add to 100 percent
with the percentage in the labor force.) As the sample statistics in
table 4.1 show, the probability that a person is partly or fully
retired rises with age, as one would expect. Examining whether
higher values of these two measures are associated with prior
receipt of UI benefits will provide part of the test for the presence
of the incentive, disincentive, windfall, or discouragement effects.
The data on UI benefits received cover the entire calendar year
prior to the survey date. However, the test of the hypotheses
depends on obtaining measures of UI benefits received during
spells of unemployment completed prior to the time at which the
data on labor force or retirement status are obtained. Because the
interviews on which the RHS is based were conducted in
April-June biennially, it is certain, given durations of spells of
unemployment, that UI income in the previous year was for a spell
of unemployment that for almost all recipients was completed by

8. White males 55-64 decreased their labor force participation from 83.3 percent of the
population to 79.0 percent between 1970 and 1973. The comparable figures for white males
65 + are 26.7 percent and 22.8 percent. (See Employment and Training Report of the
President, 1978.)

UI and Retirement

67

the time of the interview in the following year. 9 Thus for nearly all
the UI recipients in the subsamples, there is information on UI
benefits received in a spell of unemployment completed prior to
the date the information on their employment or retirement status
was obtained. The average amounts of UI benefits received are
shown in table 4.1. As in tables 2.1 and 3.1, the table shows that
the average increases as the respondents in the RHS age. As
before, it can be noted that the small increase between 1970 and
1972 in the average weekly benefits paid under the UI program
(see chapter 2) suggests that the average time during which UI
benefits are received rises sharply as the sample ages. The relation
between the amount of compensation received and later labor
force status is, of course, the focus of this chapter's inquiry.
In order to make this inquiry, the analysis relates the probability
that a person is in the labor force, and the probabilities that he
responds he is fully retired or partly retired, to other factors. (See
Appendix C for the equations reflecting these relationships.) It
then examines how these probabilities, ranging between zero and
one, are affected by UI recipient status in the previous year, and
whether those with longer compensated spells of unemployment,
and thus greater total UI benefits received, behave differently
from those who had short spells (received small amounts of
benefits). (This implicitly assumes that total benefits received are a
proxy for the duration of compensated unemployment.) In order
to isolate these effects, though, it is necessary to hold constant for
9. Since only three small states in 1970 had a potential duration in excess of thirty weeks,
nearly everyone who received UI benefits for a spell of unemployment beginning before
October 1 would have completed that spell by April of 1971. Assuming a uniform
distribution of the starting dates of spells, that means surely three-fourths of spells in the
sample that were compensated in 1970 had to be complete by the time the interview
questions about labor force status were asked. For the one-fourth of spells that began in the
last quarter of 1970, and thus whose average starting date was November IS, 1970, the
average UI benefits received in the subsample implies an average duration of 12 weeks,
assuming conservatively that the weekly benefit was $60. Only for a small fraction of the
group, those whose spells exceeded 18 weeks duration, could the spell not have been
complete by the interview date. We may conclude that, in the 1971 subsample, much less
than one-fourth of one-fourth—six percent—may still have been receiving UI on the
interview date for a spell that began in 1970. For the 1973 subsample the figure is likely to
be only slightly higher.
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other factors that affect the probability of retirement. Fortunately
the choice of these factors is simplified by the substantial body of
available research on the determinants of retirement. The evidence
suggests:
(1) Older workers are more likely to be retired, though whether
this is because of the natural effects of aging or because of induced
economic effects is unclear (see Boskin 1977 and Quinn 1977).
Accordingly, the examination of the effects of UI benefits on
subsequent retirement or employment status holds constant for
the individual's age.
(2) Because of the confusion over the causes of the relation
between age and retirement status, many researchers have tried to
abstract from health problems that may induce early retirement.
(See Parsons 1977; Grossman and Benham 1974; and Scheffler
and Iden 1974.) All have used the individual's own statement
about his health status. This approach is followed, using the
person's response to a question about whether his health limits his
ability to work. However, in order to avoid building an artificial
relation between retirement status and health status, the person's
health status as reported two years before he reported his
employment or retirement status is used.
(3) Labor force participation increases, or the probability of
retirement decreases, as the amount of education a person has
attained is greater (Bowen and Finegan 1969; Scheffler and Iden
1974). This well-known relationship is accounted for by
controlling for whether the person graduated from high school or
completed some college, or whether he completed college or
beyond.
(4) Studies have shown that a husband is more likely to retire if
his wife is not healthy, or if his wife is not attached to the labor
force (Boskin 1977; Parsons 1977). This is accounted for, along
with the biases it might induce in the estimates of the relation
between UI and subsequent retirement status, by controlling for
the wife's labor force status as a determinant of the probability
that the husband is retired.

UI and Retirement

69

(5) Several studies have found that individuals with greater
income from assets are more likely to retire early (Barfield and
Morgan 1969; Boskin 1977; and Quinn 1977). Others have shown
that higher wages are associated with a lower probability of
retirement, while still other researchers find no effect of wage rates
on retirement status. To account for all these findings, and to
control for any spurious relation between UI benefits and
retirement status that might be induced if this effect were ignored,
the income in the man's household two years prior to the survey
date is held constant.
(6) As noted in the previous section, many factors that cannot
be measured may affect retirement, particularly individual
differences in the desire to work. To account for these, the
analysis controls for the man's employment status two years
before the survey date (when the effect of UI benefits on the
probability of being in the labor force later is estimated), and for
his prior retirement status (when the effect of benefits on the
subsequent probability of his stating he is fully retired, partly
retired, or not retired at all is examined).
Estimates of the Effect of UI Benefits on the Labor Force
and Retirement Status of White Married Males
Table 4.2 presents estimates for the 1971 subsample of the
effects of each of the factors discussed above on the probability
that a white married male is in the labor force, or that he is fully or
partly retired based on his own statement. The effects are given in
percentage points; each coefficient shows the effect, in percentage
point terms, of a one-unit increase in the factor. For example, in
column (1) the change of -28.1 shows that each additional $1,000
of UI benefits received in 1970 is associated with a decrease of 28.1
percentage points in the probability that the average person in the
subsample was in the labor force in 1971. Similarly, the change of
4.5 percentage points in that column implies that men whose
spouses worked in 1971 had a probability of being in the labor
force that was 4.5 percentage points above that of men whose
wives did not work. The asterisk next to a particular change
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Table 4.2
Effects of UI and Other Factors on Labor Force and Retirement Status
of Married White Males Ages 60-64 in 1971, N = 1,664
Percentage point change in the
probability of being: a
Partly
Fully
In labor
retired
retired
force
Factor
5.2*
-11.8*
3.5
Received UI 1970
(-2.58)
(1.50)
(•72)
18.6*
-28.1*
1.9
UI dollars 1970 (in thousands)
(.52)
(3.92)
(-5.48)
4.6*
11.7*
-12.9*
Age 62 or older
(3.82)
(7.33)
(-7.55)
4.5*
-4.4*
-1.2
Spouse worked
(-.96)
(-2.62)
(2.50)
2.7*
9.8*
-11.3*
Health limited 1969
(1.84)
(5.09)
(-5.51)
-.2*
-.1
.1
Household income 1968
(-1.55)
(.98)
(-.59)
(in thousands)
-3.3*
2.6*
-.4
Completed high school
(-.29)
(-1.88)
(1.37)
or some college
-7.4*
6.5*
-.6
Completed college
(-.22)
(-2.33)
(1.90)
65.1*
Employed 1969
(26.27)
-4.6*
74.1*
Fully retired 1969
(-2.29)
(27.80)
18.5*
32.8*
Partly retired 1969
(6.22)
(8.33)
a. t-statistics, ratios of the estimated effects on probabilities to their standard errors, are
shown in parentheses.
*The effect on the probability is different from zero at the 90 percent level of confidence.
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denotes that there is a statistically significant relation between the
particular factor and labor force (or retirement) status. In
particular, when the number in parentheses exceeds 1.28, we can
be 90 percent sure that the effect exists.
Before discussing the results on the effects of UI in the 1971
subsample (table 4.2), and the 1973 subsample (table 4.3), it is
worth noting whether the effects of the other factors are the same
as has been noted in previous research. (If not, it would suggest
very little credence should be attached to any inferences drawn
here about the effects of UI.) As a consideration of the effects in
both tables shows, nearly all of these measures have significant
effects on the probability of being in the labor force, of being fully
retired, and of being partly retired. As do previous studies, these
findings indicate that: (1) Older persons are more likely to be
retired or out of the labor force; (2) Having a working spouse
increases the older married man's labor force attachment;
(3) Having a long term health problem reduces labor force
attachment; (4) Higher family income also reduces labor force
attachment and increases the probability the man views himself as
fully retired, though the effect is small and, for men 60-64 in 1971,
not statistically significant; and (5) The more educated the man is,
the more likely he is to be in the labor force, and the less the
likelihood that he views himself as fully or partly retired. Every
one of these findings accords with previous work, suggesting any
inferences drawn about the effects of UI on retirement are based
on an analysis that produces estimates consistent with earlier
research on other determinants of retirement.
It is interesting to note that, with the exception of the health
measure, each factor had a greater effect on the likelihood a
person is in the labor force, or fully retired, in the 1973 subsample
than in the 1971 subsample. Each factor becomes more important
as workers age. This finding is strengthened by a consideration of
Appendix tables C.1-C.4, in which the same probabilities are
estimated for the 1971 and 1973 subsamples classified by age
subgroups. The greatest effects are for workers ages 65-67, the
smallest for workers 60-61. It is not just that older workers are
more likely to be retired; rather, any factor that induces retirement
has a stronger effect the older the worker is.
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Table 4.3
Effects of UI and Other Factors on Labor Force and Retirement Status
of Married White Males Ages 62-67 in 1973, N = 2060
Percentage point change in the
probability of being: 8
Partly
Fully
In labor
retired
retired
Factor
force
8.7*
2.4
15.4*
Received UI 1972
(.44)
(2.84)
(1.28)
-11.4*
6.4*
-21.4*
UI dollars 1972 (in thousands)
(-4.04)
(1.52)
(-1.63)
15.8*
-17.2*
6.8*
Age 65 or older
(4.56)
(8.17)
(-9.33)
-8.3*
3.5*
7.4*
Spouse worked
(2.22)
(-4.09)
(3.72)
-2.1*
-9.6*
10.2*
Health limited 1971
(-1-33)
(-4.08)
(4.12)
-.2*
.4*
-.4*
Household income 1970
(-1.38)
(3.14)
(in thousands)
(-3.16)
-1.6*
-2.9*
3.2*
Completed high school
(-1.48)
(-1.45)
(1.62)
or some college
-5.7*
-9.4*
10.5*
college
Completed
(-2.08)
(-2.65)
(3.04)
51.7*
Employed 1971
(24.60)
-8.1*
52.8*
Fully retired 1971
(-4.44)
(22.45)
.295*
6.8*
Partly retired 1971
(1.92) (10.81)
a. t-statistics, ratios of the estimated effects on probabilities to their standard errors, are
shown in parentheses.
*The effect on the probability is different from zero at the 90 percent level of confidence.
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The major focus of this chapter is on the effect of UI benefits on
the probability of being in the labor force, or being retired, among
older married white men. Those with short spells of unemploy
ment (who received UI but only a tiny amount of benefits) have a
slightly higher probability than nonrecipients of being in the labor
force in each subsample. (This is shown by the positive effect of
"received UI" in the tables.) In the 1971 and 1973 subsamples,
those who receive large amounts of UI benefits are more likely to
be out of the labor force than nonrecipients. 10 The most important
issue, of course, is how UI benefits affect the average older
recipient's retirement behavior. As derived in Appendix C from
the estimates in table 4.2, in the 1971 subsample the average UI
recipient is 16.7 percentage points less likely to be in the labor
force than the average nonrecipient. In the 1973 subsample the
average UI recipient is 13.0 percentage points less likely to be in
the labor force than the average nonrecipient. There is virtually no
doubt that the average older male UI recipient is less likely to be in
the labor force later on than his counterpart who did not receive
UI. The evidence strongly refutes the hypothesis that, on net, UI
produces an incentive effect that raises subsequent labor force
participation. It is, though, consistent with both a causative
disincentive effect, and the correlation that is implied by the
windfall hypothesis and the discouragement effect. Which of these
possibilities is correct is the subject of the next section of this
chapter.
Before trying to distinguish empirically among the three
explanations, one should consider the effects of UI on the person's
subjective appraisal of his retirement status. In the 1971
subsample, the average UI recipient is 1.6 percentage points more
likely to view himself as fully retired, and 6.6 percentage points
more likely to view himself as partly retired than is the average
nonrecipient. In the 1973 subsample, the comparable figures are
3.9 and 8.9 percentage points. (Again, see Appendix C.) It may be
10. For example, in the 1971 subsample a person who received $100 in benefits in 1970 was
.7 percentage points (3.5 - 28.1 x .1) more likely to be in the labor force in 1971 than
someone who received no benefits. A person who received $1,500 in benefits was 38.7
percentage points (3.5 - 28.1 x 1.5) less likely to be in the labor force in 1971.
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concluded that UI benefits are not only associated with subsequent
lower labor force participation, but they are also related to
persons viewing themselves as fully, and especially as partly,
retired.
Disincentives, Windfalls, or Discouragement
In an earlier section, two tests were proposed to distinguish
whether receipt of UI produces a disincentive effect or a windfall
effect, or whether discouragement explains the greater tendency of
prior UI recipients to be out of the labor force. All effects were
consistent with a negative relationship between UI benefits and
subsequent labor force status, and such a relationship was
observed. Since the implications of the three effects for the labor
market impact of the retirement-income restriction differ
substantially, it is essential to perform any tests that might
discriminate which effect is actually operating. The first test
discriminates between the windfall and disincentive effects. It
involves examining how the effect of UI on later labor force status
differs by age group. The argument was that the windfall effect is
consistent with a greater impact of UI benefits on subsequent
labor force behavior for workers 62 and over than for those below
age 62, because UI might provide for the older worker household's
needs early in retirement and thereby allow the older worker to
postpone filing for OASI benefits and thus obtain a larger
monthly benefit later on, as implied in the epigraph.
Table 4.4 presents estimates of the differences between UI
recipients and nonrecipients in their average labor force
participation rates during the survey periods. These are presented
for the 1971 and 1973 subsamples of white married males ages:
(1) 60-61 in 1971; (2) 62-64 in 1971; (3) 62-64 in 1973; and
(4) 65-67 in 1973. The differences are based on estimates presented
in Appendix C, tables C.5 and C.6, and they are adjusted to reflect
differences between UI recipients and nonrecipients along all the
factors—spouse's work status, education, household income,
etc.—that have been held constant in order to isolate the effect of
UI benefits on subsequent participation in the labor force. Also
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shown for comparison purposes are the average labor force
participation rates for all men in each subsample, and for each age
subgroup.
Table 4.4
Adjusted Differences in Labor Force Participation Rates Between UI
Recipients and Nonrecipients Among Older Married White Males, by
Age, 1971 and 1973
Adjusted percentage point
differences in labor force
participation rates: UI
Average labor force
recipients compared with
participation rate
Survey year
nonrecipients
(percent)
and age group

1971
Total age 60-64:
Age 60-61
Age 62-64

71.5
82.2
63.3

-21.4
-25.4
-20.4

1973
Total Age 62-67:
Age 62-64
Age 65-67

45.1
60.1
27.3

-14.6
-32.7
-23.1

Let us compare the adjusted differences by age subgroup.
Among workers 60-61 in 1971, the average participation rate for
all UI recipients was 25.4 percentage points less than that for
nonrecipients. Among those 62-64, the average rate for recipients
was 20.4 percentage points less in 1971, and 32.7 percentage points
less in 1973. Finally, among those 65-67 in 1973, the average
person who received UI in 1972 was 23.1 percentage points less
likely to be in the labor force in 1973 than the average nonrecipient
in that age group.
On a relative basis, let us compare the differences in
participation rates to the average participation rate in the
subgroup. These calculations clearly show that there is a stronger
effect after age 61; for example, the effect is -25.4 percentage
points on an average rate of 82.2 percent for those 60-61; for
people 65-67 the effect is -23.1 percentage points on an average
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participation rate of 27.3. Even on an absolute basis, though, the
same conclusion may be drawn by comparing the estimated
reductions in participation for the cohort of persons age 60-61 in
1971 and 62-64 in 1973.
The evidence is fairly clear that UI benefits reduce subsequent
labor force participation more among those 62 and older than
among those 60-61. This supports the conclusion that the windfall
effect is a better explanation of the observed negative relation
between UI benefits and later labor force participation among
older married white men than is the disincentive hypothesis.
The second test was designed to distinguish between the windfall
effect and the discouragement hypothesis—the possibility that the
negative relation between UI benefits and later labor force
participation reflects discouragement about the availability of
jobs. Part of any impact of discouragement in the estimates is
removed when holding constant for earlier labor force
participation. Many persons who would be discouraged by
unemployment have only a tenuous attachment to the labor force,
and adjustment for that has been made. The finding that UI
benefits are negatively related both to subsequent participation
and subsequent subjective views on one's retirement status also
strengthens the conclusion that the discouragement effect is not
important. A man who is discouraged may well drop out of the
labor force, but would perhaps be less likely to view himself as
retired. Nonetheless, a formal test can aid in providing further
discrimination between the windfall and discouragement possibil
ities.
As noted earlier, the windfall effect will be greatest when
experience rating of UI taxes is ineffective for the recipient's
former employer (when increases in benefits charged to the
employer cannot raise the firm's UI tax rate since it is already at
the maximum rate). Becker (1972) has shown that long term
cost/tax ratios are far above 1.0 in mining, construction, and
manufacturing in the states he surveyed. The average firm in these
industries is thus more likely than the average firm in other
industries to be ineffectively experience rated, and thus more likely
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to be willing to lay off older workers seeking to receive UI benefits
as they move toward retirement. Ideally, one would like to use
data on the actual UI tax rate of the firm in which each person in
the sample was employed. Because such information is not
available, it is necessary to distinguish among UI recipients by
their previous industry of attachment to reflect possible
differences in the effectiveness of the experience rating of their
employers' taxes. This deficiency clearly biases the tests against
finding any relation between the degree of experience rating of the
UI taxes on one's former employer and one's subsequent labor
force participation, and thus against the windfall hypothesis.
Thus, if any small difference is found between subsequent
retirement behavior by UI recipients last employed in mining,
manufacturing, and construction, as compared to other recipients,
it may be inferred that the true differences are larger and that there
is evidence against the discouragement, and for the windfall,
hypothesis.
The test is performed by reestimating the effects of the various
factors discussed on the probability of labor force participation of
the men in the 1971 and 1973 RHS subsamples. This is done in
such a way as to allow inferences of: (1) Whether the men whose
current or most recent job attachment was in mining,
manufacturing, or construction (MMC) have different subsequent
labor force participation rates from other workers; (2) Whether
UI recipients from MMC have a different rate of subsequent
participation compared with recipients in other industries; and
(3) Whether the impact on subsequent participation of longer
duration of benefits (proxied by total amount of benefits received)
differs for recipients from MMC compared with those in other
industries. (The method for accomplishing this reestimation is
shown in Appendix C.) To ensure that the focus is only on those
likely to be eligible for UI in 1972 (or 1970), those who were not
employed in 1971 (1969) were deleted from the samples. This left
1,360 people in the 1973 subsample, and 1,372 in the 1971
subsample.
The relative effects of the three factors discussed in the previous
paragraph are shown for the two RHS subsamples in table 4.5.
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(These effects are adjusted for differences in spouse's work status,
education, etc. among nonrecipients, recipients from MMC, and
other recipients.) It should be noted that in the 1971 subsample,
none of the relative effects is significantly different from zero
(although the implications of the directions of the effects are the
same as those for 1973 discussed below). In that subsample, at
least, either the discouragement effect predominated, or the
weakness of the test (because of the inability to get a good fix on
the UI tax status of each worker's former employer) prevents a
discrimination between the windfall and discouragement effects.
Accordingly, the discussion concentrates on the 1973 results. The
first figure in the second column shows that the average older
married white male worker employed in mining, manufacturing,
or construction in 1972 was 8.3 percentage points less likely to be
in the labor force in 1973 than his counterpart in other industries.
The difference is likely due to greater requirements on physical
strength in these industries and the greater prevalence of
negotiated or imposed mandatory retirement provisions.
The interesting results are implied by the second and third
differences in column (2) of table 4.5. The second adjusted
difference implies that the average UI recipient from MMC differs
hardly at all in his likelihood of being in the labor force later as
compared to his counterpart in other industries. However, each
extra thousand dollars in UI benefits reduces the probability of
subsequent participation much more for workers laid off from
MMC than for others. As an example, the differences imply that
workers who received the average amount of UI benefits were only
8.7 percentage points less likely to be in the labor force later if they
had worked in MMC than in other industries. However, a worker
who received $1,000 more than the average recipient, and who had
worked in MMC, was 36.4 percentage points less likely to be in the
labor force later than comparable workers in other industries.
Assume weekly benefit amounts did not differ among recipients
from the two groups of industries. Then, the conclusion is that
long term UI recipients from MMC are more likely to be out of the
labor force later on than are long term recipients on layoff from
other industries. This conclusion, and the fact that the average

UI and Retirement

79

recipient's behavior differs very slightly between the two industry
groups, implies that the short term recipients from MMC are more
likely than others to remain in the labor force.
Table 4.5
Adjusted Differences in Labor Force Participation Rates of UI
Recipients and Other Older White Married Males, by Industry of
Employment and by Amount of UI Benefits Received, 1971 and 1973
Subsamples_______
Adjusted percentage point
difference in
participation rates 8
_________Basis of comparison_______1971_____1973
Workers in mining, manufacturing or
-8.3*
-.002
construction (MMC) compared with
(-3.07)
(-.01)
workers in other industries
UI recipients with benefits $1,000 above
the average from MMC compared with
~8 -7
2>1
recipients with benefits $1,000 above the
(-.39)
(-- 16)
average from other industries

UI recipients with benefits $1,000 above
the average from MMC compared with
-36.4*
-11.7
recipients with benefits $1,000 above the
average from other industries_________(-.63)____(-1.04)
a. t-statistics, ratios of the estimated effects on probabilities to their standard errors, are
shown in parentheses.
*The effect on the probability is different from zero at the 90 percent level of confidence.

The third difference by itself suggests that among older workers
formerly employed in these industries where experience rating was
imperfect, meaning many employers pay the maximum tax rate,
those workers who receive large amounts of UI benefits (and thus
presumably have long compensated spells of unemployment) are
less likely to be in the labor force in the following year than
similarly long term unemployed workers in other industries. This
implies that, where it costs the firm little to lay off a worker
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wishing to retire and also collect UI benefits in the process, a
greater incidence of this effect is found. This is additional evidence
for the importance of the windfall effect, and at least weak
evidence against the hypothesis that the negative relation between
UI benefits and later participation reflects older long term
beneficiaries becoming discouraged workers.
Conclusions and Implications
This chapter has examined the relationship between UI benefits
and subsequent retirement status among older married white
males. A number of reasons have been proposed why the two
might be related, and a number of tests have been performed
aimed at discriminating from among these reasons. A substantial
negative relationship was found between UI benefits and labor
force participation among older workers. The validity of this
finding is strengthened by the corroboration the estimates provide
of past results on the determinants of labor force behavior among
older males. Further, since the estimates held constant for
differences in family characteristics, for educational attainment,
and, most important, for prior labor force attachment, it is
unlikely that the negative correlation found between receipt of
substantial UI benefits and lower labor force participation is
spurious.
The correlation is greater among men ages 62-64 than among
men 60-61. From this comparison, it may be inferred that UI may
not be inducing early retirement, but may instead be acting partly
as a pure windfall to those who have already decided to retire.
Thus, restricting UI benefits on the basis of retirement income will
neither hasten nor postpone retirement. Instead, it will reduce
incomes of persons who would retire anyway.
In a sense, the windfall that UI represents for workers deciding
to retire is a retirement bonus, but it is one that many firms
assigned the maximum tax rate can pay at no cost. A weak test has
indicated that the windfall effect is more important among
workers in industries where experience rated taxes are more likely
to be at the maximum. This suggests that the employer whose UI
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taxes are not effectively covering his UI costs in a sense colludes
with the older worker wishing to receive UI benefits as he begins
his retirement. This finding, and the fact that the estimates hold
constant for labor force status two years before the survey date,
imply that the negative relation between UI benefits and
subsequent labor force participation does not just reflect
discouragement among older workers about job prospects.
The behavior suggested by the evidence is understandable: it
makes good sense for older workers to use UI benefits to cushion
the path to retirement. It suggests that the retirement-income
restriction will have no effect on retirement and labor force
decisions by older workers. Since UI benefits appear in many cases
to be a windfall to those who have already decided to retire,
removing the benefits will not change those persons' behavior.
The restriction is thus one solution to the misuse of benefits,
though it is a solution that also affects older persons seriously
interested in searching for work. Obviously, if the work test were
made more stringent, fewer UI funds would be misused in this
way. At the same time, older claimants whose spells of
unemployment are short, and for whom, the results suggest, UI
induces a slight increase in labor force participation, would face
little if any reduction in UI benefits, as they appear to make
substantial efforts to return to work.
On the surface, a stricter work test has an easy appeal as a
solution to the misuse of UI benefits implied by these findings. It
would be consistent with preventing part of the older population
from using administrative difficulties in the program to convert
this labor market insurance program into a pure transfer to them.
However, there are problems with this solution, and they are
discussed in detail in the concluding chapter.

Chapter 5
The Role of Unemployment
Insurance in the Labor Market for
Older Workers: Conclusions
and Suggested Reforms
Findings

These empirical studies of UI and the consumption and labor
market behavior of older workers and of their income distribution
have with varying degrees of certainty reached a number of
conclusions.
(1) Unemployment insurance equalizes the distribution of
income among older workers compared to what it would be in the
absence of UI benefit payments. This finding implies that anything
that increases benefit payments to the average older worker will
increase income equality within the older population. Further,
since households headed by older workers are in general less well
off than the average American household, any policy that
specifically decreases UI accruing to older workers will decrease
income equality across demographic groups stratified by age.
(2) The uniform federal restriction that reduces UI payments to
workers receiving pensions or OASI retirement benefits would, in
the early 1970s, have reduced those payments by more than
one-fourth among workers 59-64 years old, and by over 40 percent
among workers 61-66 years old. Such a restriction, enacted in the
1976 UI Amendments, P.L. 94-566, will thus substantially reduce
the total amount of UI benefit payments accruing to older
Americans. As such, because older Americans are generally less
well off than others, it will increase the income gap between older
workers and others.
(3) Within the population of households headed by older
workers, the federal restriction on the simultaneous receipt of UI
83
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and retirement income will reduce income inequality. This is
because a majority of those older workers receiving both types of
income are in the upper deciles of the distribution of income in the
older population. The restriction bears most heavily on better-off
older households. A federal restriction will thus decrease
inequality of income within an age group over the lifetimes of the
group's members, but increase it if compared across age groups.
(4) Though the retirement-income restriction will hurt mainly
better-off older households, the evidence in chapter 3 suggests that
the ability to maintain consumption during periods of unemploy
ment is greatest among these households. Indeed, the availability
of prior liquid savings, or the ability to borrow to maintain living
standards when unemployed, increases steadily as families with
lower lifetime incomes are compared to those with higher incomes.
(5) Within the population of older UI recipients it appears that
about half have access to past savings or to borrowing in sufficient
amounts so that limits on UI benefits do not cause hardship, in the
sense of substantial reductions in spending. Nearly a majority of
older UI recipients are able to smooth consumption to avoid sharp
reductions in living standards during periods of unemployment.
(6) Those families that do not have savings and cannot borrow
easily when the head is unemployed cut back disproportionately
their consumption of luxury goods. Conversely, the UI benefits
received by them are spent to restore purchases of such goods.
(7) UI benefits do not work to keep recipients in the labor force
in subsequent years; nor do they provide a disincentive that
induces workers to leave the labor force. Instead, they appear to
be extra income for workers that does not affect their decision to
leave the labor force. Similarly, they seem to be associated with,
but do not cause, older workers regarding themselves as retired.
(8) The relation between prior receipt of UI benefits and current
labor force status is much stronger among workers 65-67 than
among those 62-64, and stronger in the latter group than among
those 60-61 years old. This finding, and the fact that job
availability is held constant for each individual, supports the
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inference that UI functions as an income transfer to workers who
have made the decision to retire.
(9) The negative relation between UI and subsequent labor force
attachment is strongest for workers with long-duration unemploy
ment and those who previously worked in industries where the
experience rating of UI taxes is most likely to be ineffective. The
former result indicates that short term claimants are not using UI
as a cushion into retirement, and that the problem is concentrated
among longer term claimants. The latter result is consistent with
the observation that this misuse of UI by some older workers may
be viewed as a form of tacit collusion between the worker and his
employer. Because the benefits do not raise the employer's UI tax
liability, he is willing to collude with the worker and in doing so to
acquire the reputation—one which lowers his future labor
costs—of being a good employer to work for.
Arguments on What Should Be Done
The arguments for and against allowing pensioners to draw UI
benefits can be classified as logical—based on the view that federal
intervention in state UI programs should be minimized; as
economic efficiency arguments—based on the desire to improve
public well-being by reducing disincentives to work or to employ
resources in their most productive uses; and as equity
arguments—based on a desire to reduce income inequality. Let us
examine each of these sets of arguments in turn, considering for
each first those that suggest no retirement-income restriction
should be placed on the amount of UI payments, and then those
that imply such restrictions should be imposed.
There are three logical arguments against imposing any
restrictions:
(1) As it now stands, there are no other federal standards on
disqualifying income, potential duration, or amount of regular
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state UI benefits. 1 A federal restriction on UI benefits for
pensioners imposes the first such federal standard and opens the
door to substantial further federal intrusions.
(2) Individuals who are laid off—and who are thus involuntarily
out of work—should be able to maintain their incomes and
consumption regardless of their age and pension status as long as
they are available and seeking work. (This argument is the major
one made by Murray 1967, page 37.) Why should those who are
attached to the labor force and interested in working, but who
happen to be 60 or over, be discriminated against?
(3) To ensure that claimants, be they pensioners or not,
maintain an attachment to the labor market, UI claims officials in
the states are supposed to make sure that claimants are actively
seeking work. This is true for pensioners as well, and, if the rules
are applied properly, it ensures that those pensioners drawing
benefits are not avoiding work.
Each of these arguments can be contradicted by corresponding
logical objections:
(1) Admittedly, once one imposes a federal standard on UI and
retirement income one cannot logically argue against further
federal standards. Yet such logical rigor imposes a discipline
which would likely make many opponents of a federal restriction
very uneasy. For example, organized labor does not argue against
the restriction because it objects to federal intervention: it
recognizes that it has repeatedly urged Congress to impose federal
standards, even federally mandated uniformity, on benefit

1. The current absence of federal standards on disqualifying income, benefit amounts, etc.
is the main argument used in National Commission on Unemployment Compensation,
Interim Report, November 1978, for letting the pension restriction in P.L. 94-566 lapse.
(The Commission did, though, recommend that the entire issue of benefit standards be
considered.) Early in the history of the issue, Senator Humphrey argued, Cong. Record
87:1, S4196 March 16, 1961, that imposition of a federal standard regarding retirement
income and UI would be inconsistent with the states' rights views of many of the supporters
of such a standard.
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structures in regular state UI programs. 2 Similarly, one cannot
argue against the restriction on a logical basis and then urge
Congress to enact legislation "equalizing costs" of UI among
states. 3
(2) To what extent is the layoff of an older worker really
involuntary on the worker's part? Both economic theory
(Feldstein 1976) and empirical work (Hutchens 1979) suggest that
otherwise identical workers in states with more liberal UI benefit
structures and less experience rating of taxes are more likely to be
laid off. Chapter 4 demonstrates empirically that there is a greater
incidence of subsequent retirement among long term UI claimants
in those industries where experience rating is relatively ineffective.
This finding is consistent with the observation that, for some older
workers seeking to retire, a layoff is the result of an implicit
agreement that makes them and their employer better off. The
layoff gives some older workers temporary additional income to
supplement their pensions in the early stages of retirement. For
their employers, payroll taxes may not increase, and the employer
may be able to obtain more qualified workers if he can acquire the
reputation of being a good employer in this sense.
(3) The job search provisions of state UI laws are essential to
them, yet a massive weight of evidence (summarized in
Hamermesh 1977) suggests that UI benefits do provide a
disincentive to return to work. This being the case, one cannot
claim that local UI offices can in fact distinguish perfectly which
workers have a serious attachment to the labor market. This may
not be the fault of the local UI officials: their administrative
funding has simply not kept pace with the rise in the number of

2. See, for example, the 1975 AFL-CIO Resolution, reported in National Commission for
Manpower Policy, Proceedings of a Coherence on Labor's Views on Manpower Policy,
Special Report No. 6,1976. The resolution states that, "The AFL-CIO has long supported
federalization of the unemployment insurance program ... " and goes on to call for
minimum standards of two-thirds of the worker's weekly wage.
3. See, for example, cost equalization proposals like those proposed by Congressmen Carr
and Brodhead, 96th Congress, H.R. 1572 and H.R. 3937.
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insured unemployed. 4 Thus, even if one felt that local UI offices
could enforce job search requirements in the 1960s, one would be
less willing to hold that view in light of the relative decline in
funding of employment security administration since the early
1970s. The implications of this decline are likely to be especially
severe for efforts to monitor the activities of older workers. As
seen in chapter 2, many of them have access to retirement income,
and numerous studies have shown (see, e.g., Bowen and Finegan
1969) that such income reduces the labor force attachment of older
workers. This suggests that the older workers will, if job-seeking
requirements are not carefully enforced, be much more likely than
others to have little interest in moving off UI benefits and into
employment.
One might argue against the retirement-income restriction on
efficiency grounds: UI may provide older workers with the income
to finance productive job search that would not be undertaken if
UI benefits were not provided. Thus the inducement UI provides
the worker to stay in the labor force is beneficial, for it overcomes
the disincentives caused by people's inability to borrow to finance
job search. The counter-argument is based on the findings in
chapter 4: most older workers do not prolong their attachment to
the labor force if they receive substantial amounts of UI benefits.
There is no incentive effect that would help the labor market
operate more efficiently. There is also no disincentive that implies
a decrease in labor market efficiency. Rather, since the payment of
UI benefits to pensioners appears not to affect their behavior, on
4. For example, federal grants for employment security administration in 1967 dollars
totalled $620 million in 1969, $959 million in 1973, and $1,010 million in 1977. At the same
time, the number of insured unemployed rose from 1.177 million in 1969, to 1.793 million
in 1973, to 3.111 million in 1977. (Calculated from Bureau of the Census, Compendium of
Government Finances, 1964; Idem., State Government Finances, 1969,1973, and 1977; and
Economic Report of the President, 1979.) Clearly, fewer resources per UI recipient have
been devoted to the administration of state employment security administration programs.
This does not prove that monitoring of work-seeking efforts has become less stringent.
However, we know that most of the political pressure is aimed toward the timely payment
of claims, and anecdotal evidence from state and federal UI officials suggests that the
emphasis has indeed shifted toward this. Accordingly, we may reasonably conclude that
monitoring activities have suffered.
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the benefit side at least, any restriction will neither remove nor
introduce further disincentives into the labor market. However, as
the payment of these benefits must be financed by higher taxes,
which may distort employers' decisions about the kinds and
number of workers to hire, what is neutral on the benefit side may
produce a loss of efficiency overall because of its effects on the tax
side.
Because the evidence provides little support for efficiency
arguments on either side of the restriction issue, the importance of
equity arguments is enhanced. Among the justifications for
allowing pension recipients to receive UI benefits are:
(1) As seen in chapter 1, older households have lower incomes
than the average household in the United States. Cutting those
incomes still further by reducing these households' receipts of UI
benefits will further increase this income gap.
(2) As has been argued in Congress, pension and OASI
retirement benefits are woefully inadequate. 3 As a matter of equity
UI benefits are needed to supplement retirement benefits so that
older workers do not suffer unduly.
Countering these arguments are a number of considerations that
imply the restriction would have a less detrimental effect on the
income distribution and on commonly held concepts of fairness.
(1) Though older households are, on average, not so well off as
others, the restriction on UI benefits will, as seen in chapter 2,
impinge chiefly upon those households in the upper half of the
income distribution among older workers. Thus those households
that will experience the most severe decline in UI benefit income
will suffer least from the restriction. Moreover, as seen in chapter
3, their consumption behavior suggests that better-off older
workers have access to prior savings and borrowed funds. Sharp
cutbacks in their receipts of UI benefits would not appear to have
a severe detrimental impact on their living standards.
5. See, for example, the statements of Senators Javits and Nelson, Cong. Record, 94:2,
S17004 and S17017, September 29, 1976.
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(2) Even though older workers as a group are not so well off as
others, the income gap results to some extent from their lower
average educational attainment. One can argue that their lifetime
incomes do not differ so much from the average in the population
as their current incomes would suggest, because they began
earning income early in life and thus earned income for more
years. Why, so the argument goes, should they then receive
additional subsidies late in life?
(3) Finally, and perhaps most telling, if pension and other
retirement benefits were inadequate in the 1960s, they are, as seen
in chapter 1, surely more adequate today. Pension benefits and, to
a much larger extent, OASI retirement benefits have increased
significantly as a fraction of prior earnings since that time,
resulting in a narrowed income gap between older workers and
others.
What can one conclude from this welter of arguments pro and
con on the issue of restricting UI benefits for pensioners? The
most sensible conclusion is that anyone who believed that such a
restriction was improper in the 1960s because of inadequate
pension and OASI benefits should admit that his arguments are
less applicable now. Anyone who favored a restriction then should
be even more favorably disposed toward one today on these
grounds. Good equity grounds have been shown for believing that
such a restriction will not harm those families most in need. Part
of the support for this view stems from the findings in chapters 2
and 3. Part comes, too, from the realization of the tremendous
improvements in retirement benefits that have occurred in the past
fifteen years. It has also been demonstrated that older married
white male UI claimants, with long unemployment spells,
especially those in industries that are not well experience rated,
merely use UI benefits to ease their path into retirement. This
finding, obtained in chapter 4, had not been observed earlier.
Finally, it appears that, despite the rules requiring active job
search, it is often administratively impossible with the resources
available to discriminate from among older workers those who are
actively seeking work. Given these arguments, many of which
would not have been valid in the 1960s, the introduction of a
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broader restriction on the simultaneous receipt of UI benefits and
retirement income does not appear harsh or unreasonable. This is
especially so if, in recognition of the greater reduction in labor
force attachment that accompanies increased retirement income, it
is imposed as a do liar-for-dollar reduction, as in most states and in
the federal legislation, rather than as an outright disqualification.
Possibilities for Reform
Clearly the ideal solution to the problems outlined in this
monograph is to avoid the issue by instituting a more
discriminating enforcement of job-search requirements imposed
upon older UI claimants. Whether a sufficiently discerning
enforcement is even possible without too great an imposition on
the claimant's freedom is doubtful. It is surely impossible, though,
with the level of funding of employment security administration
that has existed in the 1970s or appears likely in the future. Thus
this ideal solution cannot in practice be implemented successfully.
A variant on the ideal solution is that definitions of suitable
work be relaxed for older workers with retirement income who are
long-duration claimants, say above 13 weeks in a benefit year, and
who are not certified by their employer to be on temporary layoff.
That this is done only for older workers may appear
discriminatory, but it recognizes the crucial distinction made in the
previous section: the older worker who receives retirement income
has less incentive to seek work while receiving UI than do other
workers. Suitable work requirements were relaxed in the
legislation extending Federal Supplemental Benefits in 1977, so
there is some precedent for this (though applying this to regular
benefits imposes a new federal standard on benefits). 6 However, if
each state passed such a requirement, it would help ensure that the
older long-duration claimant would take a job if one were
available, and it would reduce reliance on the discretion of the
6. Section 104 of P.L. 95-19 defines suitable work as "any work which is within the
individual's capabilities," and goes on to require that "emergency compensation shall not
be payable ... if during such week such individual fails to accept any offer of suitable
work or to apply for any suitable work to which he was referred by the State agency."

92

Conclusions

local claims officer. This change is consistent with the observation
that the seniority most older workers have ensures that, if they are
not on temporary layoff, they are likely to be people whose jobs
have disappeared. Thus, requiring them to take a less-skilled job
that becomes available is not likely to hurt their longer term labor
market chances, both because their previous jobs are no longer
there, and because their remaining work life is short. The problem
with this solution is that it would face vigorous legal challenges on
the grounds that it constitutes discrimination by age. To make the
requirement apply beyond the thirteenth week of unemployment
to claimants of all ages may mean imposing a harsher work
requirement than is desirable on younger claimants whose skills
may be eroded in a new, less demanding job that they would be
forced to take. In short, while a broader definition of suitable
work appears to be a reasonable answer to the problem of
discerning which older workers have a serious labor force
attachment, in fact it too suffers from flaws that are so severe as to
require a search for other alternatives.
The economic arguments of equity and improved efficiency in
the functioning of the labor market militate in favor of some
better method of ensuring that older workers receiving UI
maintain an attachment to the labor market. Faute de mieux, the
best way to do that appears to be to recognize that the receipt of
retirement income is a signal that the person's labor market
attachment is reduced; the more retirement income, the clearer the
signal. This recognition, and the realization of the severe practical
difficulties of applying work tests thoroughly, implies that the best
solution is that each state should on its own enact a requirement
that would reduce UI benefits one dollar for each dollar of
pension or OASI retirement benefits received in the week of
unemployment claimed. Such a requirement would be a
compromise between complete disqualification and continuing a
system which, as has been shown, is used by many older people,
especially those who are better-off financially, to cushion their
move into retirement. It would remove the first example of a
federal benefit standard for regular UI benefits. (The FUTA law
already has an implicit federal tax standard.) It would embody a
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recognition of recent changes in the levels of support that other
sources provide for older Americans. It would implicitly
recognize the difficulties inherent in applying job-search
requirements that may be too narrow and certainly are often
neglected by local office staffs that are often fully occupied just
with taking claims.
The basis for this proposal is a judgment that the gains from a
uniform federal restriction are outweighed by the cost of
introducing the first important federal standard on UI benefits.
However, if federal standards are imposed on other aspects of the
benefit structure, for example on states' maximum benefits, or if a
federal "cost equalization" or a "reinsurance" program that
involves continuing or repeated subsidies to certain states is
enacted, any objection to the federal restriction on the
simultaneous receipt of retirement income and UI benefits should
disappear. At that point, the restriction contained in the 1976 UI
Amendments, and that became effective in 1980, would be
justified. Until that time, and despite the gains in terms of equity
and maintenance of public confidence in the federal-state UI
system, the political cost of a major federal benefit standard
appears too great. This would suggest that, unless other federal
benefit standards become law, the federal standard restricting
receipt of UI and pensions should be repealed.
This does not mean there is no legitimate role for federal
legislation that would lessen the problems discussed and
demonstrated in this study. In particular, it is quite consistent with
existing federal intervention in regular state UI programs for
Congress to enact, as part of the experience rating provisions
under FUTA, a requirement that defines experience rating in such
a way that tax schedules are broadened and fewer employers are
ineffectively experience rated. Aside from its beneficial impact on
many other aspects of the UI program (see Hamermesh 1977), this
would help reduce the number of employers willing to see their old
employees receive UI as they move into retirement. As such, it
would ameliorate the problem by federal action without the
introduction of federal benefit standards.
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The cost of doing nothing, of continuing in most states to allow
pensioners to receive full UI benefits, is the hidden one of a
continued reduction in public confidence in the UI system. Given
the ease of the remedies at hand—both the imposition through
state legislation of dollar-for-dollar restrictions on the receipt of
UI by pensioners, and federally-imposed requirements for
improved experience rating—these costs need not continue to be
borne. Nor do new costs, in the form of federal benefit standards
that would represent a fundamental departure from the past
history of the federal-state UI program, need to be imposed. The
problem can be ameliorated within the framework and past
history of the UI program, and it can be done in a way that is
consistent with commonly-held notions of fairness and that does
not impose additional real economic costs on society.

Appendix A
DISTRIBUTIONS OF INCOME AND UI BENEFITS
IN THE RETIREMENT HISTORY SURVEY SUBSAMPLES

Table A.I presents Gini ratios and Suits statistics (see Suits,
1977, for a discussion of these latter). The Gini coefficients listed
in table A. 1 may appear somewhat high to the reader familiar with
the literature on income inequality in the United States. In fact,
they are quite consistent with Taussig's (1973) results on a cross
section of families in 1967. While the Gini coefficient for his entire
sample was .417, it was .429 for households headed by individuals
ages 55-64 and .653 for those headed by individuals ages 65 or
over.
The Suits statistics in the second row are lower than the values
reported in Ehrenberg, Hutchens, and Smith (1978), where
numbers between -.47 and -.50 appear. Nonetheless, our estimates
do suggest that UI benefits equalize distribution of income. Also,
as a comparison of the statistics in the second and third rows of
table A.I shows, the statistics become more negative in the 1970
and combined samples, indicating more equalization of the
distribution of incomes across households when the retirementincome restriction is simulated. The opposite is the case in the 1972
sample.
Table A.I
Measures of Inequality of Income and UI Distributions, 1970,1972, and
Combined Subsamples
1972 Combined
1970
Measure
.4178
.4272
.4306
Gini ratio on all other income
Suits statistics on UI
Actual amount received

-.3685

-.1537

-.2709

With retirement income
restriction

-.4035

-.1056

-.3384
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Appendix B
EQUATIONS AND EXTENSIONS OF CHAPTER 3

For each UI recipient, let Z be the minimum of UI benefits
received in years t and t-2 (a two-year lag because of the two-year
hiatus between interviews in this panel of data). Then we define
transitory UI benefits as Uj = Uj - Z, where Uj are UI benefits in
year t. Permanent income is defined as:
YPt = .5(Yt + Yt_2) + .5(2UJ + 2U{_2) + Z,
where Y is non-UI after-tax income, and YP is our measure of
permanent income. 1 The first term is an average of income flows
other than UI in the two years; for nonrecipient households, it is
the definition of permanent income. The second term is designed
to reflect the lost income replaced by UI, and it implicitly assumes
a constant replacement rate of 50 percent. (Without data on state
of residence, this is the best that can be done.) The third term is
just that part of UI benefits that can be viewed as permanent, in
the sense that it is received each year. Transitory income is simply
YTt = Yt - YPt .
In the equations to be estimated we assume each unconstrained
UI recipient household (those like the Joneses) consumes the i'th
spending category according to:
Q = aio + ail YP + ai2 (YT + U<), i = 1, . . . , N, (B-l)
where Cj is consumption of the i'th spending category, N is the
number of categories, the BJQ are constants, and the ajj and a£ are
marginal spending propensities out of permanent and transitory
income. Because our cross section data include income observed
1. In order to make the income data for the various years comparable, Yt_2 and Ut-2 were
blown up by the change in average income in the sample between years t-2 and t. Between
1968 and 1970 this was 6.57 percent, and between 1970 and 1972 it was 7.39 percent.
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only biennially, part of any measure of "transitory income" may
contain permanent components. 2 To capture this possibility we
include transitory income even for the unconstrained UI recipient
household, but we expect aji>aj2 . A household that does not
receive UI will consume according to (B-l), except that for it
U» = 0.
The constrained UI recipient household (one like the Cohens)
consumes the i'th commodity as:
Q = ai0 + an YP + YI (YT + U») , i = 1, . . . , N,

(B-2)

where Yj = a*ajj , and a* is the inverse of the marginal
propensity to spend on all consumption items, including those for
which we have no data. 3 ' Specifying the equation in this way
ensures that, if we had complete data, spending propensities by
constrained households would sum to one, as the discussion in
chapter 3 requires. Taking a weighted average of (B-l) and (B-2),
with a, the fraction of households that finds benefits to be
adequate, as one weight, and (1 - a) as the other:
Q = ai0 + aii [YP + (1 -a)(YT + U») a*] + ai2a(YT + U'),
i = 1, . . . , N.
Since we wish to include in our estimation observations for
households that have no UI benefits, and because nonrecipient
households are assumed to consume just as do unconstrained
households, this equation can be respecified as:
Q = aio +an[YP + (1 -a)a*(YT + U')D]
+ ai2 [(1 - D) + aD] (YT + U'),

i = 1, . . . , N,

(B-3)

2. Holbrook and Stafford (1971), in a study of total consumption out of different types of
income based on panel data, treat transitory income received in nonconsecutive years as
uncorrelated, and assume people have a horizon of two years or less. This view suggests
that the deviation from the average of incomes in two nonconsecutive years may be viewed
partly as a component of permanent and partly as a component of transitory income.
3. We use a value of a*, 1.122, based on time-series results in Hamermesh (1979).
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where D is an indicator variable equalling one if the individual
receives UI benefits. Equation (B-3) is the one on which the
estimates in table 3.3 are based.
Tables B.I and B.2 present the estimates of the coefficients of
the demographic and retirement-status variables included in
equations (B-3). It is important to include these seven variables: A
test of their significance in the estimates for 1972 yielded a X 2
statistic of 396. The 99 percent point of the X 2 distribution with 28
degrees of freedom is 48.28. For 1970 the value is X 2(21) = 114,
also significantly different from zero. There is substantial
variability in the coefficient estimates between the two
subsamples. However, we still find, as the tables show, that in
several cases the estimates are significant and in the same direction
in both years. (1) Female-headed households and those in which
the head is fully retired spend significantly less on transportation
than do others; (2) Households in which there is a married couple,
and even more so, where there are children, spend significantly
less on vacations than other households; and (3) Those in which
the head is partly retired or is a woman spend significantly more
on housing.
Equations (B-3) were modified to make a a function of YP,
thus enabling us to test whether the likelihood that benefits are
inadequate varies with permanent income. We specify a =
a (YP) using the logistic function:
1
(B-4)
a(YP) = ——————————————=—————»
1 + exp[-.001 /9 0 (YP - YP) + 0! ]
where PQ and /3j are parameters to be estimated. In the
specification in which a was assumed constant, equations (B-3)
were estimated by ordinary least squares for fixed values of a on
the grid (0, .05, .1, . . . , 1) to find that value of a that
maximized the likelihood function of the system. The specification
of a in (B-4) as a function of YP is estimated by a two-round
procedure that first specifies a broad lattice of values of ( /SQ, ft j)
and then searches a finer lattice around that pair of values that
maximized the likelihood function on the first round. In the 1970
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subsample the estimates are £0 = .75 and 0 = -3.5 for the
combined spending categories and for the set of equations (B-3).
In the 1972 subsample the maximizing values were
= .45 and
$ = 6.5 for both.
Table B.I
Estimates of Effects of Demographic and Work Status Variables on
Spending by Older Workers, 1970
Effects on spending on: a
Transpor
Vacations
All three
Variable
and trips
Housing
tation
categories
-38.2
Married male
-8.79
80.2
33.3
(-.21)
(-1.39)
(1.12)
(.38)
Female
-84.6
63.6
343
323
(-1.96)
(2.20)
(4.58)
(3.52)
-32.3
Children in
16.1
21.7
5.51
(-2.06)
household
(.69)
(.11)
(.53)
-104
52.0
Fully retired
72.1
19.7
(-3.70)
(2.75)
(1.47)
(.39)
Partly retired
28.1
22.9
106
157
(.85)
(1.51)
(.70)
(1.83)
White
-11.4
15.6
-34.9
-39.1
(-.44)
(-1.00)
(-.42)
(.23)
4.98
1.40
Age in years
3.29
-3.09
(.29)
(-.25)
(.70)
(.22)
a. t-statistics in parentheses.

Table B.2
Estimates of Effects of Demographic and Work Status Variables on Spending by Older Workers, 1972
Effects of spending on: a
All four
Vacations
Transportation
categories
Housing
and trips
and gasoline
Food
Variable
-227
496
368
2.84
351
Married male
(3.71)
(3.66)
(-4.22)
(.05)
(7.56)
-146
-183
-80.3
306
-56.7
Female
(-.57)
(2.86)
(-.99)
(-2.59)
(-3.71)
-181
-139
-1.26
-50.81
9.77
Children in
(-2.82)
(-.03)
(-1.97)
(.38)
(-6.22)
household
-177
-157
53.1
-19.8
-52.7
Fully retired
(-1.96)
(-.29)
(1.47)
(-1.47)
(-5.04)
-219
11.4
240
-3.12
-6.86
Partly retired
(.10)
(2.68)
(-.07)
(-.14)
(-5.28)
269
182
-5.76
-23.3
115
White
(1.90)
(1.71)
(-.10)
(-.41)
(2.35)
32.8
36.7
13.53
-12.6
-4.82
Age in years
(1.41)
(2.09)
(1.45)
(-1.36)
(-.59)
a. t-statistics in parentheses.
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Equations (B-3) are a restricted version of:
/3 i2YT(l - D) + 0 i3(YT + U»)D,
i = 1, . . . , N,

(B-5)

where the /3jj are parameters to be estimated. The estimates of
(B-5) are presented in table B.3 for the 1970 and 1972 subsamples.
The log likelihood ratio for the significance of the regression as a
whole is -2 log A. , against the alternative that there is only random
variation in the consumption measures. The regressions as a whole
are all highly significant, as were those on which the estimated
spending propensities shown in table 3.3 are based. More
important, though, is the test of the constraints on (B-5) implied
by (B-3), the model that forms the basis of our discussion. These
constraints essentially restrict spending on each commodity out of
UI to stand in the same ratio to spending out of permanent
income. Thus a test of the constraints is explicitly a test of our
hypothesis that spending on different categories out of UI is not
proportionate. The test statistics for the 1970 and 1972 subsamples
are X 2(2) = 2.96, and X 2(3) = 4.29 respectively. These are not
significantly different from zero at the 90 percent level, though
they are not ridiculously small either. They suggest that,
undoubtedly because of the relatively small number of UI
recipient households, there is not enough variation to permit so
finely structured an hypothesis to be properly tested.
Despite the insignificance of the differences between the
restricted and unrestricted models in equation sets (B-3) and (B-5),
the differences are in the expected direction. The responsiveness
index shown in table 3.5 is calculated as:
-B

100»

where B is the same as the term in braces, { ( , evaluated using
coefficients from equations like (B-3) and (B-5), but based on
spending in all categories; and Sj is the share of the i'th category in

Table B.3
Estimates of Parameters in Equations (B.5), 1970 and 1972

Spending
category
Food

Coefficients, 1970 a
Transitory UI and other income
UI
Permanent
Nonrecipients
recipients
income

Coefficients, 1972 a
Transitory UI and other income
UI
Permanent
Nonrecipients
recipients
income
-.0007
.0306
.0581*
(-.09)
(.85)
(23.96)

Transpor
tation 15

.0358*
(13.91)

.0178
(.59)

.0219*
(2.46)

.0403*
(14.50)

.0352
(.85)

.0423*
(5.02)

Vacations
and trips

.0528*
(30.62)

.0171
(.84)

-.0097*
(-1.62)

.0622*
(22.18)

.0643*
(1.54)

.0121*
(1.42)

Housing

.1897*
(42.45)

-.0364
(-.69)
3058.33*

.0279*
(1.80)

.1640*
(31.20)

.1544*
(1.97)
3555.80*

.1335*
(8.37)

-2 log A

a. t-statistics in parentheses,
b. Includes gasoline in 1972.
•Denotes significance at least at the 90 percent level.
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spending on all categories. Thus the index equals 100 for spending
on all categories. £13 is just the estimated (unrestricted)
propensity to spend out of UI. The first term in brackets weights
spending by the estimated fraction, (1 - a), of households for
which benefits are inadequate; the second term is for the
fraction, ft, for which benefits are adequate. A higher value for
the index Rj will occur if spending propensities on the i'th category
out of UI in (B-5) are disproportionately high as compared to the
average for constrained and unconstrained households in (B-3).

Appendix C
EQUATIONS AND METHODS USED IN ESTIMATING
THE IMPACT OF UI BENEFITS ON LABOR FORCE
AND RETIREMENT BEHAVIOR AMONG OLDER
MARRIED WHITE MALES

Tables 4.2 and 4.3 are based on the equation:
N
L= QO+ ai RECDUI+ (*2 UI$+ .Sj ft{X{+ a^E_2 ,

(C-l)

where L equals a zero-one variable indicating participation in the
labor force; UI$ indicates the amount of UI benefits the man
received (in thousands of dollars); RECDUI equals one if the man
received any benefits, zero otherwise; the Xj are the demographic
and other control variables; E_2 is employment status two years
before the sample survey date; and the aj and /9jare parameters
to be estimated. In the equations for full and partial retirement
status, the variable L is replaced by zero-one dummies for these
two responses, and the variable E_2 is replaced by the same
retirement variables observed in the previous wave of the RHS.
Although there are problems with the method (see below), tables
4.2 and 4.3 present estimates produced by ordinary least squares.
Tables C.I - C.4 present estimates of the basic equations (C-l)
for the two RHS subsamples disaggregated by age. They are
qualitatively (though not, as we noted in the text, quantitatively)
similar to the estimates for the entire subsamples. The fractions of
variation explained are fairly high for this kind of analysis, as were
those in the equations for which the results are reported in tables
4.2 and 4.3. In the 1971 subsample, the R2 values were .425, .453,
and .050 in the equations for labor force participation, full
retirement status, and partial retirement status. The corresponding
coefficients of determination for the equations reported in table
4.3 are .373, .349, and .103.
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Table C.I
Effects of UI and Other Factors on Labor Force and Retirement Status
of Married White Males Ages 60-61 in 1971, N = 720
Percentage point change in the
probability of being: 8
Partly
Fully
In labor
retired
force
Factor
retired
2.1*
6.3*
Constant
29.5*
(1.30)
(3.07)
(7.79)
-8.3*
-.1
Received UI 1970
11.0*
(-1.72)
(2.86)
(-.02)
-4.3
-24.3*
UI dollars 1970
5.3
(in thousands)
(-.98)
(-3.58)
(.95)
-2.7*
3.5*
Spouse worked
-1.5
(-1.02)
(-1.52)
(1.60)
4.3*
-16.0*
11.4*
Health limited 1969
(-6.22)
(2.46)
(5.25)
-.04
-.1
.2
Income 1968
(in thousands)
(-.31)
(-.46)
(.75)
-2.8*
Completed high school
.7
1.6
(.47)
(-1.43)
or some college
(.69)
-.9
Completed college
2.8
-3.7
(-1.04)
(-.20)
(1.01)
63.3*
Employed 1969
(18.24)
78.9*
Fully retired 1969
-2.8
(-.99)
(22.56)
14.9*
29.9*
Partly retired 1969
(3.52)
(5.63)
R2
.046
.464
.559
a. t-statistics in parentheses.
* Denotes significance at the 90 percent level or better.
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Table C.2
Effects of UI and Other Factors on Labor Force and Retirement Status
of Married White Males Ages 62-64 in 1971, N=944
Percentage point change in the
probability of being: 8
Partly
Fully
In labor
retired
retired
force
Factor
10.7*
13.1*
16.9*
Constant
(6.26)
(5.33)
(3.35)
-12.9*
.4
6.1
Received UI 1970
(.08)
(-1.74)
(.78)
-30.1*
6.1
25.5*
UI dollars 1970
(1.14)
(-4.07)
(3.57)
(in thousands)
-5.3*
5.2*
-1.2
Spouse worked
(-2.04)
(-.60)
(1.92)
8.3*
-7.5*
1.5
1969
limited
Health
(-2.48)
(2.84)
(.69)
-.2*
.3*
-.3
Income 1968
(-1.43)
(1.45)
(-1.16)
(in thousands)
-3.9*
-1.3
3.4
Completed high school
(-1.42)
(-.62)
(.79)
or some college
-10.7*
12.4*
-3.4
Completed college
(-2.20)
(-.95)
(2.46)
66.3*
Employed 1969
(19.37)
72.4*
-5.3*
Fully retired 1969
(-1.91)
(19.34)
34.5*
20.1*
Partly retired 1969
(6.34)
(4.97)
R2
.045
.373
.380
a. t-statistics in parentheses.
•Denotes significance at the 90 percent level or better.
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Table C.3
Effects of UI and Other Factors on Labor Force and Retirement Status
of Married White Males Ages 62-64 in 1973, N = 1119
Percentage point change in the
probability of being: a
Partly
Fully
In labor
retired
retired
force
Factor
10.4*
15.1*
23.9*
Constant
(5.16)
(8.32)
(4.00)
-2.7
-5.6
5.6
Received UI 1972
(.66)
(-.46)
(-.67)
7.7*
-20.5*
UI dollars 1972
14.3*
(-3.14)
(1.70)
(2.22)
(in thousands)
6.9*
-7.8*
2.3
Spouse worked
(2.57)
(1.22)
(-2.93)
8.1*
-1.9
-9.8*
Health limited 1971
(-3.28)
(-.92)
(2.73)
-.01
-.1
.18
Income 1970
(-.07)
(-.69)
(.83)
(in thousands)
3.0
-2.6
-2.5
Completed high school
(1.05)
(-1.32)
(-.91)
or some college
-6.8*
5.6
-6.0
Completed college
(1.10)
(-1.93)
(-1.19)
57.3*
Employed 1971
(16.94)
63.6*
-1.4
Fully retired 1971
(17.01)
(-.52)
16.5*
34.5*
Partly retired 1971
(8.18)
(2.74)
R2
.293
.071
.289
a. t-statistics in parentheses.
•Denotes significance at the 90 percent level or better.
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Table C.4
Effects of UI and Other Factors on Labor Force and Retirement Status
of Married White Males Ages 65-67 in 1973, N = 941
Percentage point change in the
probability of being: a
Partly
Fully
In labor
retired
retired
force
Factor
20.4*
42.0*
11.1*
Constant
(7.39)
(13.15)
(3.93)
-23.2*
13.3
15.1*
1972
Received UI
(1.23)
(-1.86)
(1.31)
-22.7*
2.6
18.2*
UI dollars 1972
(.30)
(1.79)
(-2.41)
(in thousands)
5.9*
-8.2*
7.3*
Spouse worked
(2.17)
(-2.60)
(2.51)
-3.3*
-8.8*
11.1*
Health limited 1971
(-1.34)
(3.84)
(-3.30)
.6*
-.7*
-.2
Income 1970
(-1.18)
(-4.60)
(3.65)
(in thousands)
-1.0
-3.2
2.7
Completed high school
(-.40)
(-1.10)
(.99)
or some college
-12.1*
14.3*
-5.0
Completed college
(-1.14)
(-2.39)
(3.05)
47.0*
Employed 1971
(18.06)
-12.6*
44.3*
Fully retired 1971
(-4.78)
(14.59)
25.5*
-1.2
Partly retired 1971
(6.80)
(-.27)
R2
.129
.279
.332
a. t-statistics in parentheses.
•Denotes significance at the 90 percent level or better.
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The differences between the average UI recipient and the
average nonrecipient in the probability of subsequent labor force
participation are calculated as &i + 02 UI$, where the ( A )
denotes the estimated values of the parameters, and the superior
bar denotes the means of the variable among UI recipients. The
estimated variance of this average effect is just:
Var ( a 2 ) Uf$2 +2-uT$-Cov ( ai a 2 ) + Var ( ai) .

(C-2)

The estimates reported in footnote 10 in chapter 4 are calculated
similarly, except different values of UI$ are used in place of its
mean,
Because the predicted values of the dependent variables may lie
outside the zero-one range in the formulation in (C-l), the
estimates cannot be used if we wish to derive statistically proper
comparisons of the adjusted differences in retirement probabilities
between recipients and nonrecipients in the different subsamples.
Thus the estimated impacts presented in table 4.4 are based on
logit estimates of equations like (C-l). The estimation was done
using a logit program developed by Peter Schmidt and discussed in
Schmidt and Strauss (1975).
The logit coefficients for the two samples, and for the two age
subgroups within each, are presented in tables C.5 and C.6. As can
be seen by comparing them to the ordinary least squares estimates
in tables 4.2, 4.3, and C.I - C.4, the same variables are generally
significant in the logit estimates. (Logit estimates for the
probability of being fully retired were also estimated for the entire
1973 subsample, and the estimates did not differ qualitatively
from those presented in table 4.3.) The differences presented in
table 4.4 are calculated by substituting the sample means for the
Xj and E_2 into the equations containing the logit parameters, and
estimating then the difference in the probability that L = 1 when
UI$ = UI$ and RECDUI = 1, as compared to when both are zero.

Ill
Table C.5
Logit Estimates of Labor Force Equations, Married White Males by
Age, 1971
Logit coefficients a
Ages
Ages
Total
62-64
60-61
subsample
Factor
-.679*
-2.146*
-.925*
Constant
(-1.72)
(-6.89)
(-3.66)
-.513
.279
.066
ReceivedUI1970
(-.79)
(.53)
(.15)
-1.325*
-1.490*
-1.463*
UI dollars 1970
(-2.93)
(-2.13)
(-3.70)
(in thousands)
-1.140*
~
~
Age 62 or older
(-7.20)
.464*
.363*
.392*
Spouse worked
(1.90)
(1.59)
(2.48)
-1.560*
-.472*
-.833*
Health limited 1969
(-2.42)
(-5.27)
(-5.55)
.024
-.018
-.0063
Income 1968
(-1.15)
(.81)
(-.46)
(in thousands)
.223*
.193
.229
Completed high school
(1.18)
(.62)
(1.36)
or some college
.944*
.573*
-.173
Completed college
(-.31)
(2.40)
(1.80)
3.351*
3.528*
3.471*
Employed 1969
(12.42)
(9.08)
(16.30)
a. t-statistics in parentheses.
*Denotes significance at the 90 percent level or better.
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Table C.6
Logit Estimates of Labor Force Equations, Married White Males by
Age, 1973
Logit coefficients 3
Ages
Ages
Total
65-67
62-64
subsample
Factor
-2.003*
-1.609*
-1.930*
Constant
(-2.61)
(-2.90)
(-9.45)
-.902
-.334
.551*
1972
UI
Received
(-1.28)
(-.66)
(1.33)
-1.326*
-1.196*
-1.114*
UI dollars 1972
(in thousands)
(-1.95)
(-2.63)
(-3.31)
-1.016*
~
~
Age 65 or older
(-8.82)
.539*
.458*
.413*
Spouse worked
(2.53)
(2.55)
(3.58)
-.692*
-.556*
-.600*
Health limited 1971
(-3.28)
(-3.31)
(-4.59)
-.067*
-.028*
-.001
Income 1970
(-4.06)
(-.10)
(-3.17)
(in thousands)
.215*
.197
.186
Completed high school
(.99)
(1.12)
(1.70)
or some college
.118*
.701*
.338
Completed college
(3.23)
(1.11)
(3.06)
3.55*
3.190*
2.920*
Employed 1971
(11.93)
(12.39)
(17.44)
a. t-statistics in parentheses.
•Denotes significance at the 90 percent level or better.
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The estimates on which table 4.5 is based come from an
equation like (C-l) to which the following sum has been appended:
YQ MMC + Yj RECDUI-MMC + 72 UI$-MMC ,

(C-3)

where MMC equals one if the person's current or most recent job
was in mining, manufacturing or construction, and zero
otherwise, and the Yj are parameters to be estimated. The
adjusted relative differences reported in the first row are just the
estimated YQ ; those in the second row are calculated as
YQ + ?! + Y2 Uf$, while those in the third row are
Y 0 + ?! + y 2 (UI$ + 1). where UI$ is the mean UI income
received by beneficiaries in MMC industries. The standard errors
of the estimated relative differences between the average UI
recipient in MMC and elsewhere, upon which the t-statistics
reported in table 4.5 in chapter 4 are based, are calculated exactly
as are those based on equation (C-2), except that the Yj
coefficients are used, as is UI$ for persons in MMC industries.
The F-statistic on the set of three coefficients in (C-3) is .32, not
significantly different from zero at conventional levels of
significance in the 1971 subsample. In the 1973 subsample it equals
3.92, significant with the appropriate degrees of freedom at the 99
percent level. Finally, the effects of the other variables in (C-l)
were not seriously changed by the deletion of persons for whom
E-2 = 0 or by the addition of the terms in (C-3).
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